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Although legal commentators these days rarely question the legitimacy of judges engaging in
judicial review based on equality grounds, judicial review on substantive due process grounds
remains highly controversial. One of the principal reasons for this legitimacy disparity is the view
that substantive due process calls on judges to incorporate their personal views and moral values
into the constitutional analysis in ways that equality review does not. This Article introduces the
concept of “equality’s dependence” to explain how value judgments that fall outside of egalitarian
considerations must be incorporated into the analysis to give the concept of equality its normative
bite. The Article also uses gay rights constitutional cases to question the legitimacy disparity
between liberty and equality review by showing how judges make normative judgments in equality
gay rights cases that are surprisingly similar to the ones they make while engaging in substantive
due process review. These similarities undermine the view that equality is a more neutral or “selfcontained” constitutional norm than liberty, one that allows judges to decide cases without
bringing to bear their normative values regarding the underlying moral and policy issues raised by
the litigation.
The Article also uses gay rights cases to explain why judicial review on liberty grounds can play a
role in reinforcing democratic processes that is as salutary as that played by equal protection
review. In addition, the Article points to examples from gay rights constitutional litigation to
question the widely held view that the striking down of legislation on substantive due process
grounds inevitably imposes greater limitations on legislative discretion than does the voiding of
laws on equality grounds. The Article’s ultimate claim is that if judges and legal commentators
are generally comfortable with the idea of courts measuring state action against constitutional
principles of equality, then they should also be generally comfortable with courts doing the same
with constitutional principles of liberty.
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INTRODUCTION
There is a widely held view in American legal circles that if a law
must be struck down on constitutional grounds, it is better to do it
under equal protection principles than under the substantive com1
ponent of the Due Process Clause. Indeed, it sometimes seems that
judicial review on liberty grounds will never overcome the specter of
2
Lochner v. New York and its progeny. Almost everyone agrees that the
Supreme Court in those cases improperly relied on substantive due
process considerations to strike down economic and labor reforms
1

2

As Rebecca Brown explains,
[f]or many decades, the Supreme Court has appeared more confident in its own
legitimacy when protecting equality rather than liberty. When it has addressed issues of unequal treatment on the basis of race or other group characteristics—
even when judicial intervention meant the dismantling of entrenched local policy—the Court has not expressed the severe disquiet with its institutional role that
we have come to expect when it addresses issues arising under the Liberty Clause.
Rebecca L. Brown, Liberty, The New Equality, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1491, 1500 (2002); see also
Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537, 538 (1982) (“Fifty years ago
equality was dismissed as a legal argument of ‘last resort,’ one to be eschewed until all
available ‘rights’ had been tried and rejected; today equality is becoming the argument of
first choice, one that threatens to swallow ‘rights’ that once ranked far above it.” (footnotes omitted)).
See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 57 (1905) (striking law prohibiting bakers from
working more than sixty hours a week on the ground that it violated the freedom to contract as a protected liberty right under the Fourteenth Amendment).
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instituted during the Progressive and New Deal eras. And the
4
Court’s ruling in Roe v. Wade, in which it used substantive due
process to hold that the Constitution affords women the right to terminate pregnancies, remains its most controversial decision of the
5
contemporary era.
While the legitimacy of substantive due process review has been
controversial for most of the last century, there is not these days
much disagreement among legal commentators (and judges) about
6
the legitimacy of judicial review based on equality principles —
though there are continued reservations expressed about judicial re7
view in general as well as frequent disagreements about how equality
8
principles should be applied in individual cases.
3

4
5

6

7

8



See, e.g., Nelson Lund & John O. McGinnis, Lawrence v. Texas and Judicial Hubris, 102
MICH. L. REV. 1555, 1564 (2004) (“The Lochner era has come to symbolize the practice of
judges illegitimately legislating from the bench.”); Victoria F. Nourse, A Tale of Two
Lochners: The Untold Story of Substantive Due Process and the Idea of Fundamental Rights, 97
CALIF. L. REV. 751, 751–52 (2009) (“Lochner symbolizes the grave political dangers of substantive due process, with its ‘repulsive connotation of value-laden’ judicial review.”). But
see Richard A. Epstein, Liberty, Equality, and Privacy: Choosing a Legal Foundation for Gay
Rights, 2002 U. CHI. LEGAL. F. 73, 84 (“[W]e should regard Lochner not as a constitutional
horror story, but as a model for sensible constitutional deliberation.”).
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
See Laurence H. Tribe, The Treatise Power, 8 GREEN BAG 291, 296 (2005) (noting that in
deciding Roe, “the Court reached the most controversial result of the past half-century”);
see also Lund & McGinnis, supra note 3, at 1556 (“Millions of Americans regard Roe as
judicial authorization for mass murder, and understandably continue to oppose the
Court’s approach to abortion.”).
As Rebecca Brown notes, “[o]ver the past century . . . both judges and scholars have increasingly endorsed judicial review of equality claims . . . . By contrast, countermajoritarian concerns have led courts to refrain from judicial review of liberty claims.”). Brown,
supra note 1, at 1491 (footnotes omitted).
It should be noted that politicians and members of the public do not usually distinguish between judicial review that is grounded on equality grounds and one that is
grounded in liberty doctrine. For example, many who question the legitimacy of courts
deciding the constitutionality of gay marriage bans seem to care little whether judges
strike down those bans on equal protection or due process grounds. For a discussion of
the legitimacy of judicial review in the context of same-sex marriage, see Shannon Price
Minter, The Great Divorce: The Separation of Equality and Democracy in Contemporary Marriage
Jurisprudence, 19 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 89 (2010).
For a recent articulation of that skepticism, see Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case
Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE L.J. 1346 (2006). For book-length critiques of judicial review written by progressive scholars, see LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES:
POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004); MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE
CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999). The problematics of judicial review from
the perspective of majoritarian democracy are usually traced back to the influential work
of Alexander Bickel. See ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE
SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (Yale Univ. Press 2d ed. 1986) (1962).
See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007)
(striking down, by a 5–4 vote, student assignment plan that relied on racial classifications
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There are several reasons for the legitimacy disparity between
equality and liberty review. One is the way in which courts used
equality principles to end decades of de jure racial segregation. If Roe
is the most controversial Supreme Court ruling of the last fifty years,
9
the equality case of Brown v. Board of Education remains the most cel10
ebrated in its history. To question the general legitimacy of judges
striking down legislation under the Equal Protection Clause is in
some sense to question the legitimacy of the judiciary’s contribution
to ending the system of racial caste in America. In short, “Brown [is]
a paradigm of the courts doing something right, just as Lochner [is] a
11
paradigm of the courts doing something wrong.”
Another reason for the legitimacy disparity between judicial review grounded in equality and one grounded in the substantive component of the Due Process Clause is the unique institutional function
that judges are thought to play when interpreting the Equal Protection Clause. From this perspective, rulings under the latter provision
are more legitimate than those under the former because they require judges to engage in what has come to be understood as a quintessential judicial function, that is, the policing of the legislative
branch to make sure that it sufficiently accounts for the interests of
12
all groups when enacting legislation. This understanding of equality
review, which owes much to the influential scholarship of John Hart
Ely, views it as reinforcing rather than undermining representative
13
democracy.
In contrast to the important institutional function that courts play
when reviewing legislation under the Equal Protection Clause, the
substantive component of the Due Process Clause, it is argued, calls
for the exercise of a different type of judicial function, one that requires judges essentially to legislate by taking sides in contested moral

9
10

11
12

13

to promote diversity); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (upholding, by a 5–4 vote,
law school’s use of race as an admissions factor in order to promote diversity).
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
See Jeremy Waldron, supra note 7, at 1350 (noting that “the fiftieth anniversary of Brown v.
Board of Education provided a timely reminder of the service that the nation’s courts performed in the mid-twentieth century by spearheading the attack on segregation and other
racist laws”).
John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Moral of MacPherson, 146 U. PA. L. REV.
1733, 1792 (1998).
See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 152–53,
161 (1980) (arguing that heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause is appropriate when the democratic process has failed to account for the interests of unpopular minorities).
See infra notes 110–13, 238–42 and accompanying text.
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and policy disputes. As a result, liberty review is viewed by many as
antidemocratic because it is thought to undermine rather than
15
strengthen representative democracy.
In addition to greater institutional legitimacy, equality review also
has a greater perceived remedial legitimacy. The striking down of
legislation under substantive due process principles is commonly
thought to constitute a more intrusive form of judicial action because, in the words of Justice Robert Jackson, it “leaves ungoverned
14

15

See Daniel O. Conkle, Three Theories of Substantive Due Process, 85 N.C.L. REV. 63, 78 (2006)
(“Needless to say, the identification and protection of unenumerated, nonoriginalist constitutional rights by the unelected Supreme Court—with the Court nullifying legislative
judgments on fundamental questions of political morality—is a highly controversial practice.”); Lund & McGinnis, supra note 3, at 1557 (“It is a commonplace observation—often
repeated by members of the Court itself—that substantive due process makes judges into
unelected and unremovable superlegislators.”); id. at 1604 (noting that substantive due
process, unlike John Hart Ely’s procedural theory of judicial review, “has no . . . limiting
principle, and there is no apparent reason to expect that its results will be systematically
better than those produced by American democracy”).
See Cass R. Sunstein, Liberty After Lawrence, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1059, 1063 (2004)
(“A . . . substantive due process holding is legitimately challenged on democratic
grounds. It overrules the views of citizens and their elected representatives, carving out a
domain of liberty into which government may not enter.”). Professor Brown notes that
“in contrast to the new attitude about equality, the judicial guarantee of individual liberty
has been branded antithetical to democracy. Accordingly, claims of liberty are often understood as assertions of ‘trumps’ against majority decisions and thus in tension with
democratic rule. Courts have been wary.” Brown, supra note 1, at 1494 (footnote omitted); see also id. at 1501–02 (“Equality cases have not recently triggered an institutional
alarm warning of antidemocratic judicial tyranny. But repeatedly, against constitutional
claims of liberty, that bell tolls.”).
The Supreme Court’s discomfort with liberty-based substantive rights may account
for the oddity of decisions such as Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942), in which the
Court addressed the constitutionality of a statute requiring the sterilization of some convicted felons. Despite the statute’s seemingly clear liberty implications, the Court struck it
down on equal protection grounds because the sterilization was mandated for those who
committed certain crimes but not others. For a critique of Skinner on this point, see
Brown, supra note 1, at 1506–07. For a defense of the Court’s decision to view the sterilization statute as an impermissible form of class legislation, see Kenneth L. Karst, Why
Equality Matters, 17 GA. L. REV. 245, 283 (1983).
The Court’s predilection for equality claims over liberty ones also likely accounts for
the conceptually odd “fundamental rights” component of the Equal Protection Clause,
which the Court has applied in cases implicating the right to vote and to travel. As Professor Brown puts it,
[t]his often inscrutable variation on the equality principle has perplexed and concerned many commentators, primarily because it depends upon a blending of liberty and equality concepts. It emerged when the Court began to identify certain
liberties that, although unspecified in the Constitution, should receive special protection from legislative infringement. Curiously, however, it grounded the special
protection for unenumerated liberties in the Equal Protection Clause.
Brown, supra note 1, at 1508–09 (footnote omitted); see also Westen, supra note 1, at 561–
64 (criticizing the “fundamental rights” equality cases for focusing on equality considerations rather than on the relevant underlying substantive rights).
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and ungovernable conduct which many people find objectionable.”
Successful liberty-based challenges, in other words, deprive the State
of the authority to regulate in certain areas. In contrast, the striking
down of legislation under equal protection principles is generally
understood to be less intrusive of the legislature’s prerogatives because it remains free to continue to regulate in the area in question,
17
albeit by using constitutionally appropriate classifications.
Later in this Article, I return to the institutional and remedial arguments in support of the view that equality review is more legitimate
18
than liberty review. Most of this Article, however, addresses an additional reason for the widely shared skepticism about liberty review,
namely, that it encourages (or allows) judges to assess the constitutionality of legislation based on their personal values and moral
19
views. Although this criticism, grounded in concerns about greater
16
17
18
19



Ry. Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring).
See infra notes 269–79 and accompanying text.
See infra Part III.
I recognize that some of the perceived illegitimacy of liberty review is due to textual considerations. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, in providing that no
state “shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law,”
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, seems to prohibit only procedurally improper deprivations
of liberty without explicitly recognizing any substantive protections. See Conkle, supra
note 14, at 69 (“By its terms, the language suggests no limitation on procedurally proper
deprivations, nor does it authorize the recognition of substantive constitutional rights.”).
(The same is true of the almost identically phrased Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.) “[D]espite the strength of this textual argument, the Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected it.” Conkle, supra note 14, at 69. In
fact, since “substantive due process has become an entrenched part of constitutional law,”
Sunstein, supra note 15, at 1062, it is appropriate to look beyond purely textual considerations to assess the overall legitimacy of liberty review. See Ryan C. Williams, The One and
Only Substantive Due Process Clause, 120 YALE L.J. 408, 411 (2010) (“[E]ven the most ardent
textualists acknowledge that constitutional provisions may sometimes reflect specialized
‘term-of-art’ meanings that are not readily apparent from the meanings of the individual
words comprised therein.”).
Another reason why some question the legitimacy of substantive due process review is
because of its supposed inconsistency with the intent of those who drafted the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, Substantive Due Process After Gonzales v. Carhart, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1517, 1532 (2008) (“Under an originalist reading of
the Due Process Clauses, . . . there is no requirement that legislation be ‘reasonable’ in
the eyes of federal and state judges.”); see also McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct.
3020, 3062 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“This Court’s substantive due process
framework fails to account for both the text of the Fourteenth Amendment and the history that led to its adoption . . . .”). Although I do not in this Article address the critique
of liberty review that is grounded in considerations of original intent, it is worth noting
that there is a rich literature that questions the historical accuracy of that critique. See,
e.g., James W. Ely, Jr., The Oxymoron Reconsidered: Myth and Reality in the Origins of Substantive Due Process, 16 CONST. COMMENT. 315 (1999); Frederick Mark Gedicks, An Originalist
Defense of Substantive Due Process: Magna Carta, Higher-Law Constitutionalism, and the Fifth
Amendment, 58 EMORY L.J. 585 (2009); Robert E. Riggs, Substantive Due Process in 1791,
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judicial subjectivity, follows to some extent the institutional critique
20
already noted, it is a conceptually distinct criticism. That is, the institutional critique is based on the idea that the striking down of legislation on liberty grounds undermines rather than reinforces repre21
sentative democracy. In contrast, the subjectivity critique is based
on the notion that liberty review impermissibly calls on judges to rely
on their personal values and preferences in assessing the constitutio22
nality of state action. Interestingly, that same criticism is not usually
23
raised against equality review.

20

21
22

23



1990 WIS. L. REV. 941 (1990); Williams, supra note 19; see also McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3090
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[T]he historical evidence suggests that, at least by the time of
the Civil War if not much earlier, the phrase ‘due process of law’ had acquired substantive content as a term of art within the legal community.”).
See J. Skelley Wright, Judicial Review and the Equal Protection Clause, 15 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 1, 14 (1980) (noting that the Court’s rulings during the Lochner era “were not only
merely undemocratic . . . . Precisely because they were informed [by the Justices’] view of
right policy, rather than a legal principle, the decisions were [also] primarily in one direction”).
See supra notes 14–15 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE
LAW 31 (1990) (asserting that substantive due process has been used “countless times . . .
by judges who want to write their personal beliefs into a document that, most inconveniently, does not contain those beliefs”); Lund & McGinnis, supra note 3, at 1560 (“[D]ue
process has continued to provide a textual thunderbolt that Olympian judges can hurl at
any law that offends them.”); id. at 1603 (“[S]ome Justices have simply assumed that the
Constitution must include a provision that gives them the discretionary power to impose
their personal visions of justice and what they think of as the more transcendent dimensions of liberty.”); see also Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) (noting
that great care must be taken “lest the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause be
subtly transformed into the policy preferences of the Members of this Court” (citation
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Gumz v. Morrissette, 772 F.2d 1395, 1406
(7th Cir. 1985) (Easterbrook, J., concurring) (“Substantive due process is a shorthand for
a judicial privilege to condemn things the judges do not like or cannot understand.”),
overruled on other grounds by Lester v. Chicago, 830 F.2d 706 (7th Cir. 1987).
Andrew Koppelman, for example, has noted that while there is some “indeterminacy” in
equality claims that leave room for judicial discretion, see Andrew Koppelman, The Right to
Privacy?, 2002 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 105, 116, the degree of such is much greater in substantive
due process cases because “[t]he privacy doctrine inappropriately requires judges to decide what is important in life.” Id. at 106; see also Watkins v. U.S. Army, 837 F.2d. 1428,
1440 (“[T]he practical difficulties of defining the requirements imposed by equal protection, while not insignificant, do not involve the judiciary in the same degree of valuebased line-drawing that the Supreme Court in Hardwick found so troublesome in defining
the contours of substantive due process.”), amended by 847 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1988); William D. Araiza, Foreign and International Law in Constitutional Gay Rights Litigation: What
Claims, What Use, and Whose Law?, 32 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 455, 457 (2006) (noting that
the Supreme Court’s decision in Lawrence v. Texas “was aggressive, in that it explicitly
went out of its way to rely on a broader and more value-laden grounding—substantive
due process, rather than equal protection—to reach its result”).
The perception of substantive due process as calling (or allowing) for a greater degree of judicial subjectivity (or activism) than equal protection has not been consistent in

8
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The crux of the complaint behind the subjectivity criticism of liberty review goes to the nature of the normative assessments that
judges must make in adjudicating constitutional claims. When
viewed in comparative terms, the subjectivity criticism holds that the
Equal Protection Clause calls for a type of judicial review that is neutral in ways that the application of substantive due process principles
24
is not. This is why the perceived danger of judges “legislating from
the bench” seems to be more acute in the context of liberty cases
25
than in equality ones.

24

25



our history. Writing in 1979, for example, Professor Ira Lupu claimed that “the last two
decades have revealed that the equal protection clause is at least as easily abused as [is
substantive due process]. Its relative infancy as an activist tool and its textual invitation to
excess in the name of equality have combined to overwhelm the forces of restraint.” Ira
C. Lupu, Untangling the Strands of the Fourteenth Amendment, 77 MICH. L. REV. 981, 1075–76
(1979); see also id. at 994 (“The equal protection clause did for the Warren Court precisely
what the due process clause did for the Lochner-era Court—it served as a vehicle for judicial intervention in state policy choices to promote a set of values responsive to the Justices’ vision of political and social ideals.”); Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal
Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 341, 341 (1949) (noting that the Equal Protection
Clause, “characterized by Mr. Justice Holmes as ‘the last resort of constitutional lawyers,’
has long been treated by the Court as a dubious weapon in the armory of judicial review”).
See Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on
a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 43 (1972) (arguing that because equal protection analysis focuses on means and not ends it avoids the
dangers of “dogmatically imposed judicial values”); Wright, supra note 20, at 17–18 (arguing that “the equal protection clause has only a limited utility for imposing judicial
views on the legislative process . . . . Unlike the . . . due process clause, the equal protection clause cannot be invoked to require either the national government or the states to
create wholly new rights in their residents”); see also Lupu, supra note 23, at 985 (arguing
that the Equal Protection Clause “cannot and should not bear a substantive content”).
Kenneth Karst has taken issue with the notion that the Equal Protection Clause lacks
substantive content:
The search for a “central guiding principle” [in equality cases] seems to have been
inhibited by a widely shared assumption that the equal protection clause lacks
substantive content. That assumption is mistaken. Equality, as an abstraction, may
be value-neutral, but the fourteenth amendment is not. The substantive core of
the amendment, and of the equal protection clause in particular, is a principle of
equal citizenship, which presumptively guarantees to each individual the right to
be treated by the organized society as a respected, responsible, and participating
member.
Kenneth L. Karst, The Supreme Court 1976 Term, Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1, 4 (1977).
One commentator has recently explained that
[f]or the general purpose of protecting individual freedom . . . an equal protection approach is preferable to a substantive due process approach, which has exposed the Court to charges of “legislating from the bench.” Whereas an equal
protection approach just involves courts in a comparative analysis of statutes that
might burden groups of individuals differently, a substantive due process approach often requires that courts “identify unenumerated constitutional rights.”
Patrick M. Garry, An Equal Protection View of the First Amendment, 28 QUINNIPIAC L. REV.
787, 798–99 (2010) (footnote omitted); see also Conkle, supra note 14, at 66 (“The Su-
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In this Article, I use gay rights cases to question the notion that
equality review restrains or cabins judges’ subjective views about the
underlying moral and policy issues raised by constitutional litigation
in ways that liberty review does not. In particular, I highlight the crucial role that judges’ normative assessments—regarding questions
such as the relevancy of sexual orientation in public policy matters,
the purpose of the institution of marriage, and the capability of samesex couples to form committed and loving relationships—play in both
equality and liberty gay rights cases.
My objective in this Article is not to question the legitimacy of
equality review but is instead to bring greater respectability to liberty
26
review. If there is little reason to question the appropriateness of
judges making normative assessments in applying constitutional
equality principles when deciding gay rights cases, and if those assessments are frequently similar to the ones that judges make in considering gay rights claims raising liberty questions, then there is less
of a reason to question the appropriateness of judges making normative judgments in applying substantive due process principles when
deciding gay rights cases.
There are two points that I make in the prior sentence that need
elaboration. First, notice that I am speaking generally about types (or
categories) of judgments, not about any particular judgment. It is
important to distinguish between, on the one hand, the legitimacy of
judges making normative assessments about moral or policy questions
as part of their equality and liberty constitutional analyses, and, on
the other, the appropriateness or correctness of particular judgments
in any given case. In this Article, I am interested in the former issue
and not in the latter.

26

preme Court’s welter of decisions and its confusing doctrinal standards have emboldened
the Court’s critics, who view the ‘doctrine’ of substantive due process as little more than a
judicial charade, an excuse for selective and unprincipled ‘legislating from the bench.’”).
This Article does not address the question of whether the constitutional review of legislation by judges is something to be praised or criticized. (For recent elaborations on that
issue, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Core of an Uneasy Case for Judicial Review, 121 HARV. L.
REV. 1693 (2008); Waldron, supra note 7.) Instead, the question I address here is the extent to which, assuming that the judicial review of legislation is proper, equality review is
more legitimate than liberty review.
In addition, while this Article discusses equality and liberty issues in gay rights cases, it
does not address how questions of judicial review and institutional competence impact
the interests of sexual minorities. For scholarship on those issues, see, e.g., Darren Lenard Hutchinson, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Affirmative Action, Sodomy, and Supreme Court
Politics, 23 LAW & INEQ. 1 (2005); Nancy J. Knauer, The Recognition of Same-Sex Relationships:
Comparative Institutional Analysis, Contested Social Goals, and Strategic Institutional Choice, 28
U. HAW. L. REV. 23 (2005); Ruthann Robson, Judicial Review and Sexual Freedom, 30 U.
HAW. L. REV. 1 (2007).
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Second, because I limit my discussion in this Article to gay rights
cases, I cannot claim conclusively that the similarities in the equalityand liberty-based normative assessments that judges make in deciding
constitutional claims raised in gay rights litigation are also found in
lawsuits raising other issues. But if I am correct that many of the
normative assessments judges make in deciding equality gay rights
cases are similar to those they make in adjudicating liberty gay rights
claims, that renders suspect the notion that substantive due process
intrinsically calls on judges to make subjective assessments based on
their personal views that can be largely avoided in equality cases.
The question may be asked why this Article focuses on gay rights
cases as opposed to other constitutional disputes. In my estimation,
gay rights constitutional litigation is a particularly helpful vehicle for
comparing equality and liberty analyses because that litigation fre27
quently raises claims under both theories. This has been the case in
28
lawsuits involving a wide variety of issues, including sodomy laws,
29
30
same-sex marriage bans, gay adoption bans, and the military’s for31
mer “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy. The dual equality and liberty
claims raised in many gay rights constitutional cases allows for a fruit-

27

28

29

30

31

A quarter of a century ago, Supreme Court Justice Paul John Stevens noted a link between liberty and equality in gay rights cases when he wrote that
[a]lthough the meaning of the principle that “all men are created equal” is not
always clear, it surely must mean that every free citizen has the same interest in “liberty” that the members of the majority share. From the standpoint of the individual, the homosexual and the heterosexual have the same interest in deciding
how he will live his own life, and, more narrowly, how he will conduct himself in
his personal and voluntary associations with his companions. State intrusion into
the private conduct of either is equally burdensome.
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 218–19 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (adjudicating constitutional challenge to
law criminalizing same-sex sodomy that raised both equality and liberty claims); Jegley v.
Picado, 80 S.W.3d 332 (Ark. 2002) (same); Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487
(Ky. 1993) (same); Gryczan v. State, 942 P.2d 112 (Mont. 1997) (same); Campbell v.
Sundquist, 926 S.W.2d 250 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996) (same).
See, e.g., In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008) (adjudicating constitutional challenge to same-sex marriage ban that raised both equality and liberty claims); Kerrigan v.
Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008) (same); Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub.
Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003) (same); Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196 (N.J. 2006)
(same).
See, e.g., Lofton v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804 (11th Cir.
2004) (adjudicating constitutional challenge to gay adoption ban that raised both equality and liberty claims); In re Matter of Adoption of X.X.G. and N.R.G., 54 So. 3d 79 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (same).
See, e.g., Cook v. Gates, 528 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 2008) (adjudicating constitutional challenge
to “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy that raised both equality and liberty claims); Witt v.
Dep’t of the Air Force, 527 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 2008) (same).
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ful comparison of the ways in which judges make normative judg32
ments under both theories.
The fact that gay people are seeking judicial recognition of liberty
interests in matters related to sexuality and relationships already enjoyed by heterosexuals explains why so many gay rights constitutional
33
cases raise both equality and liberty claims. This has meant, in turn,
that commentators have paid significant attention to the interplay of
34
equality and liberty in gay rights constitutional litigation. That lite32

33

34



In contrast, for example, the constitutionality of abortion restrictions has been litigated
almost exclusively under the Due Process Clause. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S.
124 (2007); Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). (This is so despite the opinion of several commentators
that equal protection principles provide more appropriate grounds for analyzing abortion-related issues. See, e.g., Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality
in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. REV. 375 (1985); Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body:
A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L.
REV. 261 (1992); see also Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L.
REV. 955, 963 (1984) (arguing that abortion regulations should be analyzed from the
perspective of sex equality).) Also, in contrast to gay rights matters, constitutional issues
related to race and gender have been litigated almost exclusively under the Equal Protection Clause. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996); Brown v. Bd. of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
History shows how liberty claims of gay people follow (usually by a few decades) those of
heterosexuals. For example, after the Supreme Court recognized the constitutional
rights of straight individuals in matters related to sexual intimacy in the 1960s and 1970s,
see, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (recognizing constitutional right of unmarried individuals to use contraceptives when married couples are permitted to use
them); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (striking down statute prohibiting
use of contraceptives as applied to married couples), gay rights advocates tried to get the
same recognition for gay people, first unsuccessfully in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186
(1986), and then successfully in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). Similarly, the Supreme Court, starting in the late 1960s, recognized that heterosexuals have a fundamental right to marry. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1
(1967). Approximately thirty years later, gay rights advocates began regularly asking
courts to rule that same-sex couples enjoy the same right. See, e.g., Baehr v. Lewin, 852
P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993); Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003);
Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).
See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Destabilizing Due Process and Evolutive Equal Protection, 47
UCLA L. REV. 1183, 1201–14 (2000) (arguing that due process principles have played the
primary role in constitutionally advancing the interests of lesbians and gay men, while
equality has played a subsidiary role); Pamela S. Karlan, Foreword: Loving Lawrence, 102
MICH. L. REV. 1447, 1449 (2004) [hereinafter Karlan, Loving Lawrence] (arguing Lawrence
“is a case about liberty that has important implications for the jurisprudence of equality”);
Pamela S. Karlan, Equal Protection, Due Process, and the Stereoscopic Fourteenth Amendment, 33
MCGEORGE L. REV. 473, 474 (2002) [hereinafter Karlan, The Stereoscopic Fourteenth Amendment] (using Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), among others, to show that “the ideas of
equality and liberty expressed in the equal protection and due process clauses each
emerge from and reinforce the other”); Pamela S. Karlan, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and
Equality in Relation to Justice Blackmun, 26 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 59, 63 (1998) [hereinafter Karlan, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality] (pointing to gay rights cases to show
how “liberty can serve to backstop equality. That is, liberty arguments can explain why
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rature, however, has focused mostly on what the authors believe are
the proper interpretations or applications of the two constitutional
principles rather than, as this Article does, on the ways in which both
principles call on judges to make similar normative judgments in adjudicating the underlying claims.
This Article will proceed as follows. In Part I, I explain why judges
are required, under different theories of substantive due process, to
make normative judgments in controversial matters of morality and
policy to determine whether the legislation in question impermissibly
35
violates constitutionally protected liberty. Although what I here call
“liberty’s subjectivity” has been recognized by others before—in fact,

35

two classes of individuals cannot be treated unequally.”); Koppelman, supra note 23 (arguing that equality makes for a better constitutional grounding for gay rights claims than
does privacy); Cass R. Sunstein, Homosexuality and the Constitution, 70 IND. L.J. 1, 3 (1994)
(same); Cass R. Sunstein, Sexual Orientation and the Constitution: A Note on the Relationship
Between Due Process and Equal Protection, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1161, 1163 (1989) (arguing, in
the aftermath of Hardwick, that the Due Process Clause is generally backwards-looking in
that its substantive applicability is governed by the nation’s traditions while the Equal Protection Clause is generally forward-looking in that it frequently requires the overturning
of established practices); Nelson Tebbe & Deborah A. Widiss, Equal Access and the Right to
Marry, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1375 (2010) (arguing that the constitutionality of same-sex marriage bans should be analyzed under the fundamental rights branch of equal protection
doctrine because doing so acknowledges that the issue raises both liberty and equality
concerns); Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The Fundamental Right That Dare Not
Speak Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1898 (2004) (noting that “Lawrence, more than
any other decision in the Supreme Court’s history, both presupposed and advanced an
explicitly equality-based and relationally situated theory of substantive liberty”); Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 778 (2011) (arguing that “[b]y deciding Lawrence on liberty grounds, the Court quieted pluralism anxiety” because it
viewed the case “not [as] a group-based equality case about gays, but rather [as] a universal liberty case about the right of all consenting adults to engage in sexual intimacy in the
privacy of their homes”).
There has also been much commentary in the law reviews recently on the intersection of liberty and equality considerations generally, see, e.g., Kenneth L. Karst, The Liberties of Equal Citizens: Groups and the Due Process Clause, 55 UCLA L. REV. 99, 102 (2007)
(calling “attention to the ways in which equal citizenship’s antisubordination values have
contributed to individual liberties, as those liberties are embodied in the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause”); Nelson Tebbe & Robert L. Tsai, Constitutional Borrowing, 108 MICH. L. REV. 459, 461 (2010) (exploring “the practice of importing doctrines, rationales, tropes, or other legal elements from one area of constitutional law into
another for persuasive ends” and paying “particular attention to cases in which the Court
has traded between liberty and equality”), and on issues that go beyond gay rights. See,
e.g., David H. Gans, The Unitary Fourteenth Amendment, 56 EMORY L.J. 907 (2007) (arguing
that a holistic understanding of Fourteenth Amendment provisions best protects women’s reproductive freedoms); Radhika Rao, Equal Liberty: Assisted Reproduction Technology,
76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1457 (2008) (exploring notion of equal liberty in the context of
assisted reproduction technology); cf. CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER & LAWRENCE G. SAGER,
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND THE CONSTITUTION (2007) (proposing an equal liberty approach to the Religious Clauses).
See infra notes 56–84 and accompanying text.
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as we have seen, it is one of the principal criticisms of substantive due
36
process doctrine —what has not been recognized is that that subjectivity is analogous to what I here call “equality’s dependence.”
In order to explain what I mean by equality’s dependence, Part I
37
builds on an article by Professor Peter Westen to explore why normative assessments that fall outside of egalitarian considerations must
be incorporated into the constitutional analysis in order to decide
38
whether equality principles are applicable in any given case. This
means that judicial determinations of what equality demands can be
as dependent on normative judgments regarding the moral and policy issues raised by a particular controversy as are judicial determina39
tions of what constitutionally protected liberty requires. As a result,
equality, as a constitutional principle, is not necessarily any more selfcontained or neutral than is liberty.
In Part II, I explore the normative assessments that judges have
made in deciding liberty claims in sodomy and same-sex marriage
40
cases. I then look at the normative assessments that different state
supreme courts have made in analyzing same-sex marriage bans under equality principles and that the Supreme Court made in deciding
41
Romer v. Evans. In doing so, I will show that judges adjudicating liberty and equality gay rights cases make surprisingly similar types of
normative assessments—neither the discretion that is part of those
assessments nor the scope of the normative inquiry varies in any significant way depending on whether the gay rights claim is based on
liberty or on equality considerations.
Finally, in Part III, I return to the institutional and remedial bases
for the greater perceived legitimacy of equality judicial review over
42
liberty review already noted and find them generally wanting, at
least in the context of gay rights jurisprudence. Specifically, regarding institutional legitimacy, I argue that judges, in assessing liberty
claims in gay rights cases can reinforce democratic processes in ways
that are similar to what is expected of them when they engage in
43
equality review. In addition, regarding remedial legitimacy, I claim
36
37
38
39
40
41

42
43

See supra notes 19–25 and accompanying text.
Westen, supra note 1.
See infra notes 85–98 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 99–107 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 112–66 and accompanying text.
517 U.S. 620 (1996) (assessing constitutionality of a state constitutional provision prohibiting state and local governments from providing antidiscrimination protection to lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals); see infra notes 167–223 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 12–17 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 238–65 and accompanying text.
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that the striking down of legislation under liberty review in gay rights
constitutional cases does not restrict the authority of the legislature to
regulate in matters of sexuality and intimate relationships to a significantly greater degree than does the invalidation of laws under equali44
ty review.
Three last points need addressing before proceeding. First, it is
important to distinguish the types of normative assessments, based on
considerations of morality and policy, that I believe judges must make
in deciding both equality and liberty gay rights claims from the
judgments of political morality that Ronald Dworkin has argued judges
45
must rely on to decide constitutional disputes. As is well known,
Dworkin has defended what he calls a moral understanding of the
Constitution, one that requires judges to “interpret and apply the[]
[Constitution’s] abstract clauses [like those pertaining to equal protection and due process] on the understanding that they invoke mor46
al principles about political decency and justice.” My focus in this
Article is not on the deeper principles of political philosophy that
Dworkin references but is instead on narrower (and less ambitious)
moral and policy judgments on questions such as the relevancy of
sexual orientation for the distribution of rights and benefits, the core
purposes of the institution of marriage, and the capability of lesbians
and gay men to participate in committed and loving relationships. It
may very well be that the normative assessments that judges must
make in both the equality and liberty gay rights cases that I discuss in
Part II are themselves dependent on the types of judgments of political morality that Dworkin emphasizes in his work, but that is an issue
47
I do not explore here.
Second, in contending that constitutional principles of equality
and liberty call on judges to make similar normative assessments in
gay rights cases, I do not mean to suggest that there are no important
44

45
46
47

See infra notes 266–96 and accompanying text. I also question the notion that successful
equality-based challenges, and the resulting incentives to broaden the impact of legislation, always serve to protect against arbitrary and unreasonable government actions. See
infra notes 297–315 and accompanying text.
See generally RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION (1996).
Id. at 2.
In some of my other writings, I have explored the intersection of gay rights and questions
of political morality, but I have done so from the perspective of political, rather than constitutional, theory. See, e.g., CARLOS A. BALL, THE MORALITY OF GAY RIGHTS: AN
EXPLORATION IN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY (2003) [hereinafter BALL, THE MORALITY OF GAY
RIGHTS]; Carlos A. Ball, Communitarianism and Gay Rights, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 443 (2000);
Carlos A. Ball, Moral Foundations for a Discourse on Same-Sex Marriage: Looking Beyond Political Liberalism, 85 GEO. L. J. 1871 (1997).
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differences between the adjudication of equality and liberty claims.
Those differences clearly exist, as is reflected in legal doctrine. For
example, the Court’s tiered form of equality review, which calls for
heightened scrutiny under some circumstances, requires the asking
of questions (such as whether the group alleging improper differen48
tial treatment has suffered a history of discrimination and whether
the trait in question affects the ability of individuals to contribute to
49
society) that are not constitutionally relevant when judges grapple
with substantive due process issues.
There are also deeper, more conceptual differences between constitutionally protected equality and liberty. For example, the equality
analysis is intrinsically relational in ways that the liberty one is not.
That is, equality requires an assessment of how some groups have
been treated under the law in relation to others in ways that the liberty analysis, which focuses on questions of governmental interference
50
with certain choices made by individuals, does not. Despite these
differences, I believe there are crucial similarities in the types of
normative assessments required of judges under both constitutional
principles, similarities that do not allow for easy generalizations regarding the degree of subjectivity that accompanies the two forms of
analysis.
Finally, I do not in this Article argue that liberty review is preferable to equality review in matters related to gay rights (or to any other
51
issue), nor do I argue for a particular understanding (whether
broad or narrow) of substantive due process protections. Instead, my
objective is to question the widely held view that judicial review based
on liberty considerations is less legitimate than equality review.
48
49
50

51

See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531–32 (1996); Mass. Bd. of Retirement v.
Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976).
See, e.g., Cleburne v. City of Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 441 (1985); Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (plurality opinion).
Peter Westen explains this point through the following examples:
[T]he right of a person to the privacy of his home is a noncomparative right because it can be ascertained without reference to the relative status of other persons. In contrast, the right of black children to attend the public schools on the
same basis as white children is a comparative right because the rights of black
children are determined by reference to the privileges enjoyed by white children.
PETER WESTEN, SPEAKING OF EQUALITY: AN ANALYSIS OF THE RHETORICAL FORCE OF
“EQUALITY” IN MORAL AND LEGAL DISCOURSE 131–32 (1990); see also Kenneth W. Simons,
Equality as a Comparative Right, 65 B.U. L. REV. 387, 389 (1985) (“A right to equal treatment is a comparative claim to receive a particular treatment just because another person
or class receives it. The claim to that treatment is not absolute, but relative to whether
others receive it.”).
For an argument that progressives in general, and gay rights supporters in particular,
should emphasize liberty over equality claims, see Yoshino, supra note 34, at 793–97.
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I. NORMATIVE ASSESSMENTS IN LIBERTY AND EQUALITY REVIEW
One of the frequent criticisms of substantive due process doctrine
is that it encourages (or allows) judges to incorporate into the constitutional analysis their personal views about the moral and policy posi52
tions behind the legislation that is subject to challenge. In contrast,
53
this objection is not usually raised against equality review. In this
section of the Article, I explore the nature of the normative assessments that seems to inhere in liberty cases regardless of which theory
54
of substantive due process a court applies. I then explain why it is
that, as a conceptual matter, equality review can be as dependent on
judges’ normative assessments regarding the moral and policy issues
55
raised by the controversies in question as is liberty review.
A. Liberty’s Subjectivity
In a recent article, Professor Daniel Conkle explores three differ56
Under the first theory,
ent theories of substantive due process.
judges determine whether the claimed right is consistent with the na57
tion’s history and traditions. This was the approach the Supreme
Court took in Bowers v. Hardwick when it relied on the country’s long
history of sodomy regulations to hold that consensual and private
58
same-sex sexual conduct was not constitutionally protected. The
Court more recently also embraced a strong historical approach to
substantive due process in Washington v. Glucksberg, a case in which it
rejected the argument that the Constitution recognized a fundamental right to assisted suicide because of what it argued was the “consistent and almost universal tradition [in this country] that has long re59
jected [such a] right.” The Court added that, as a methodological
matter, “[o]ur Nation’s history, legal traditions, and practices . . . provide the crucial ‘guideposts for responsible decisionmaking’
60
that direct and restrain our exposition of the Due Process Clause.”
A second substantive due process theory, which also finds support
in some of the Court’s decisions, is what Professor Conkle calls that of

52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

See supra notes 19–25 and accompanying text.
See id.
See infra notes 56–84 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 85–107 and accompanying text.
See Conkle, supra note 14.
Id. at 83–90.
478 U.S. 186, 192–93 (1986).
521 U.S. 702, 723 (1997).
Id. (quoting Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992)).
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61

“reasoned judgment.”
Under this approach, “the Supreme
Court . . . evaluate[s] the liberty interest of the individual and
weigh[s] it against competing governmental concerns, determining
on this basis whether the liberty interest deserves protection as a con62
stitutional right.” Conkle argues that the Court implicitly adopted
this theory in first recognizing a woman’s constitutional right to ter63
minate a pregnancy in Roe v. Wade and then more explicitly embraced it in reaffirming such a right almost twenty years later in
64
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey. In this latter
case, Conkle notes, the Court relied on “reason” and “fairness” to defend the notion, first embraced in Roe, that viability outside the womb
is the crucial moment at which the State’s interest in protecting the
fetus outweighs the privacy and autonomy based rights of the preg65
nant woman.
Conkle also argues that when the Court in Lawrence v. Texas struck
66
down a sodomy statute partly because of an “emerging awareness”
that considerations of liberty protect the sexual choices of individuals, it was following a third substantive due process theory, one that
looks to evolving national values to assess the constitutionality of leg67
islation. Conkle claims that this third approach, properly understood, best balances the need for some objectivity in the Court’s due
process analysis—assured through a requirement that its rulings be
grounded in values that “command widespread contemporary sup-

61
62
63
64
65
66

67

Conkle, supra note 14, at 66.
Id. at 99–100.
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
505 U.S. 833 (1992).
Conkle, supra note 14, at 104–05.
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572 (2003) (noting “an emerging awareness that liberty
gives substantial protection to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives
in matters pertaining to sex”).
Conkle, supra note 14, at 121–23. Conkle notes that the “evolving national values” approach was suggested by Justice John Harlan in his dissent in Poe v. Ullman:
Declaring that due process reflects “the balance struck by this country,” Harlan
mentioned not only “the traditions from which it developed” but also “the traditions from which it broke,” because “tradition is a living thing.” Exactly what Harlan meant is unclear, but this language suggests that substantive due process
should protect not only historical rights but also rights that have emerged over
time, gaining sufficient support in our contemporary law and culture that the Supreme Court can properly recognize their existence without engaging in “unguided speculation.”
Conkle, supra note 14, at 124 (footnote omitted). I explore Justice Harlan’s dissent in Poe
below when discussing the normative assessments that some Supreme Court Justices have
reached when considering the constitutionality of sodomy laws. See infra notes 115–27
and accompanying text.
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68

port” —with the need for interpretative flexibility and dynamism giv69
en that the nation’s values change over time.
For our purposes, the important point to note is that all three
theories of substantive due process require judges to make normative
assessments in establishing the appropriate baseline with which to determine whether the legislation subject to challenge impermissibly
violates constitutionally protected liberty. This point is perhaps
clearest in the context of the reasoned judgment approach, which
Conkle argues comes close to Ronald Dworkin’s view that judges
must make judgments of political morality in deciding difficult con70
stitutional questions. But the same is true of the other two substantive due process theories. Under the “evolving values” approach, the
Court must apply its reasoned judgment to determine whether a particular value, which may be widely but not uniformly shared across
the nation, constitutes a proper basis for the recognition of a fundamental right under the Liberty Clause. As Conkle explains,
[t]he Court must decide, as an independent normative judgment,
whether the asserted right deserves national constitutional protection,
thereby protecting the right even in states that choose not to follow the
general national pattern. In resolving this question, the Court inevitably
must employ a methodology analogous to that required by the theory of
reasoned judgment. It must determine, in essence, whether the claim of
right supported by the national culture is a claim that warrants recogni71
tion as a matter of political-moral reasoning.

Defenders of the historical approach contend that it, unlike the
other ways of determining the scope of substantive due process rights,
72
significantly cabins the discretion of judges. Supporters of this approach contend that a “restrained methodology” which relies on the
68
69
70
71
72

Conkle, supra note 14, at 68.
Id. at 128.
Id. at 98 (citing DWORKIN, supra note 45, at 3–4, 11); see also supra notes 45–48 and accompanying text.
Conkle, supra note 14, at 98–99.
See, e.g., McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3063 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(noting that the “effort to cabin the exercise of judicial discretion under the Due Process
Clause by focusing its inquiry on those rights deeply rooted in American history and tradition invites less opportunity for abuse than the alternatives”); Andrew T. Hyman, The
Little Word “Due,” 38 AKRON L. REV. 1, 29 (2005) (“The obvious way for the Court to prevent recurrent legislation from the bench would be by hewing to the objectivistic interpretation of ‘due’ process that is supported by the historical record underlying the Bill of
Rights, and is mandated by the very structure of the Constitution.”); Lund & McGinnis,
supra note 3, at 1608 (praising the historical approach “because it does not collapse constitutional law into a matter of mere political preference, undermining the judicial function”); see also Cass R. Sunstein, The Right to Marry, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 2081, 2105 (2005)
(“A decision to root substantive due process in traditions, narrowly understood, might be
the best way of reducing judicial mistakes and judicial burdens . . . .”).
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“guideposts” of history and tradition allows for the “rein[ing] in [of]
the subjective elements that are necessarily present in due process
73
judicial review.” It is not clear, however, why historical assessments
of which values qualify as proper normative bases for reviewing legislation under substantive due process principles are necessarily more
objective than the types of assessments called for by the other two approaches. One only need look at the starkly different ways in which
the Court used the history of sodomy regulations in Bowers v. Hardwick and Lawrence v. Texas to see that history, in fact, fails to provide
74
objective guidance to judges.
The Hardwick Court viewed the history of sodomy statutes exclusively through the prism of homosexuality, not once mentioning that
those statutes traditionally did not make any distinctions based on the
75
sex (or sexual orientation) of the parties. Without any explanation,
the Court deemed that part of the historical record to be constitutionally irrelevant. The Court also conveniently ignored the seemingly relevant historical fact that it was not until decades after the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted that some jurisdictions began to
criminalize the particular sexual act (oral sex) that Michael Hardwick
76
was arrested for, a fact that undermined its contention that the pro77
hibition of that conduct had “ancient roots.”
In contrast, the Lawrence Court viewed the historical record quite
differently because it refused to view sodomy laws as representing
long-standing and specific condemnations of same-sex sexual intima78
cy. Instead, the Court understood those laws to be part of a broader

73

74
75
76

77
78

Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721–22 (1997); see also id. at 720–21 (“[W]e have
regularly observed that the Due Process Clause specially protects those fundamental
rights and liberties which are, objectively, ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.’” (emphasis added) (citations omitted)).
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
See CARLOS A. BALL, FROM THE CLOSET TO THE COURTROOM: FIVE LGBT RIGHTS LAWSUITS
THAT HAVE CHANGED OUR NATION 207–08 (2010).
See WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, CARLOS A. BALL & JANE S. SCHACTER, CASES AND MATERIALS
ON SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW 165 (3d ed. 2008) (“[O]ral sex was not prohibited
until states, at the end of the nineteenth century and early part of the twentieth century,
expanded the scope of their sodomy statutes.”); Anne B. Goldstein, History, Homosexuality,
and Political Values: Searching for the Hidden Determinants of Bowers v. Hardwick, 97 YALE
L.J. 1073, 1085–86 (1988) (“[I]n both 1791 and 1868 statutes proscribing ‘sodomy,’ ‘buggery,’ and the ‘crime against nature,’ were interpreted to proscribe anal intercourse only—not fellatio, the act for which Hardwick was arrested.”).
Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 192.
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 568 (“[I]t should be noted that there is no longstanding history in
this country of laws directed at homosexual conduct as a distinct matter.”); id. at 570
(“[F]ar from possessing ‘ancient roots,’ American laws targeting same-sex couples did not
develop until the last third of the 20th century.” (quoting Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 192)).

20

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 14:1

regulatory regime aimed at nonprocreative sexual activity, one that
applied regardless of the sex (or sexual orientation) of the parties in79
volved.
The subjectivity of the historical approach is only deepened by the
analytical effect of a crucial antecedent question to its application,
namely, what is the right that might be deeply rooted in the nation’s
history? For the Hardwick Court, the antecedent question (antecedent, that is, to the historical review) was whether there was a fundamental right to engage in a particular class of sexual acts (anal and
80
oral sex) by a particular class of individuals (lesbians and gay men).
But as the Lawrence Court saw it, this was an inappropriately narrow
81
For that Court, the crucial normative
way of framing the issue.
question was whether all individuals (regardless of sexual orientation) have a widely recognized liberty interest in choosing sexual
82
partners without interference by the State.
Even assuming, then, that history teaches us “objective” lessons
about which values are most important, what history teaches surely
depends on the questions that we ask of it. The historical record
does not by itself tell us which questions to ask. The amount of discretion that seems to accompany the framing of the issue in fundamental rights cases, including those in which judges follow the historical approach, belies the contention of the approach’s supporters
that it is a significantly more objective way of proceeding than the al83
ternatives.
79

80

81

82
83



Id. at 568 (“[E]arly American sodomy laws were not directed at homosexuals as such but
instead sought to prohibit nonprocreative sexual activity more generally.”); id. at 570
(“The longstanding criminal prohibition of homosexual sodomy upon which the [Hardwick] decision placed such reliance is as consistent with a general condemnation of nonprocreative sex as it is with an established tradition of prosecuting acts because of their
homosexual character.”).
Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 190 (“The issue presented is whether the Federal Constitution confers a fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy . . . .”); see also id.
(“We . . . register our disagreement . . . that the Court’s prior cases have construed the
Constitution to confer a right of privacy that extends to homosexual sodomy . . . .” (emphasis
added)).
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567 (noting that the Hardwick Court “fail[ed] to appreciate the extent of the liberty at stake. To say that the issue . . . was simply the right to engage in certain sexual conduct demeans the claim the individual put forward, just as it would demean a married couple were it to be said marriage is simply about the right to have sexual
intercourse.”).
Id. (noting that sodomy “statutes . . . seek to control a personal relationship that . . . is
within the liberty of persons to choose without being punished as criminals”).
See, e.g., Jack Balkin, Tradition, Betrayal, and the Politics of Deconstruction, 11 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1613, 1615 (1990) (“[T]here are many different ways of describing a liberty, and
many different ways of characterizing a tradition.”); Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C.
Dorf, Levels of Generality in the Definition of Rights, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1057, 1058 (1990) (ar-
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In short, the substantive due process analysis calls for a considerable degree of judicial subjectivity regardless of a court’s analytical methodology (that is, regardless of whether it emphasizes reasoned
judgment, evolving values, or history and tradition). It is precisely
this subjectivity, as we have seen, which contributes in powerful ways
84
to the perceived illegitimacy of liberty review. What is not usually
recognized, however, is that equality review also requires judges to
make crucial normative assessments, driven by the underlying moral
and policy issues raised by the litigation, in establishing the appropriate baseline with which to determine whether the legislation subject
to challenge impermissibly violates equal protection principles. It is
to that issue that I turn to next.
B. Equality’s Dependence
Almost thirty years ago, Professor Peter Westen published an ar85
ticle in the Harvard Law Review titled “The Empty Idea of Equality.”
The article, which sent shockwaves through some segments of the legal academy, contended that the concept of equality—defined by
Westen as the “proposition in law and morals that ‘people who are
alike should be treated alike’ and its correlative, that ‘people who are
86
unalike should be treated unalike’”—is normatively meaningless.
Westen explained that before we can determine whether individuals
87
ought to be treated alike, we need to establish whether they are alike.
But since human beings have an almost infinite number of similarities and differences, independent standards and rules are required to

84
85

86
87

guing that “[t]he selection of a level of generality [in the fundamental rights analysis]
necessarily involves value choices” and rejecting the notion, advanced by Justice Antonin
Scalia, that choosing the lowest or most specific level of generality is a “value-neutral method”); see also John C. Toro, The Charade of Tradition-Based Substantive Due Process, 4 N.Y.U.
J.L. & LIB. 172, 178 (2009) (“Contrary to the Supreme Court’s assurances, the [historical]
test fails meaningfully to constrain judicial discretion.”).
See supra notes 19–25 and accompanying text.
Westen, supra note 1. Westen elaborated on his 1982 Harvard Law Review article in a
book published eight years later. See WESTEN, supra note 50. When relevant, I explain in
some of the notes that follow how Westen’s views on certain equality-related issues
changed between the publishing of the article and the appearance of the book. See infra
notes 93, 103, and 192.
Westen, supra note 1, at 539–40 (footnote omitted).
As Westen explained it,
[t]he formula “people who are alike should be treated alike” involves two components: (1) a determination that two people are alike; and (2) a moral judgment
that they ought to be treated alike. The determinative component is the first.
Once one determines that two people are alike for purposes of the equality principle, one knows how they ought to be treated.
Id. at 543.
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determine ex ante which similarities and differences are relevant giv88
en a particular moral or legal question.
It is the substantive component of those standards and rules, rather than the concept of equality itself, that determines whether any
two individuals should be treated alike. Westen explained that
[j]ust as no categories of “like” people exist in nature, neither do categories of “like” treatment exist; treatments can be alike only in reference to
some moral rule. Thus, to say that people who are morally alike in a certain respect “should be treated alike” means that they should be treated
in accord with the moral rule by which they are determined to be alike.
Hence “likes should be treated alike” means that people for whom a certain treatment is prescribed by a standard should all be given the treatment prescribed by the standard. Or, more simply, people who by a rule
89
should be treated alike should by the rule be treated alike.

In Westen’s view, equality is “an empty vessel with no substantive
moral content of its own. Without moral standards, equality remains
meaningless, a formula that can have nothing to say about how we
should act. With such standards, equality becomes superfluous, a
90
formula that can do nothing but repeat what we already know.” As
Westen saw it, equality is a derivative value, secondary to the standard
or rule that specifies which similarities and differences are relevant.
Statements of equality (or inequality) entail comparisons of two things or
persons by reference to some external criterion that specifies the relevant
respect in which they are the same or different. To say that an apple is
“like” or “equal to” an orange means that, despite their many differences,
they each possess the feature or features that are relevant to an external
criterion, whether those features be weight, surface area, or sugar content; to say that they are “unequal” means that they do not share the relevant feature, whether it be color, taste, or juice content. This analysis also holds for ethical and legal statements of equality, the only difference
being that, instead of testing the persons or things by a descriptive standard for determining which of them are the same, one tests them by a
moral or legal standard for deciding which of them should be treated the
same. In each case, however, the comparison for purposes of equality

88
89

90

See id. at 544–47.
Id. at 546–47. H.L.A. Hart made a similar point when he observed that
though “Treat like cases alike and different cases differently” is a central element
in the idea of justice, it is by itself incomplete and, until supplemented, cannot afford any determinate guide to conduct. This is so because any set of human beings will resemble each other in some respects and differ from each other in others and, until it is established what resemblances and differences are relevant,
“Treat like cases alike” must remain an empty form. To fill it we must know when,
for the purposes in hand, cases are to be regarded as alike and what differences
are relevant.
H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 155 (1961).
Westen, supra note 1, at 547 (footnote omitted).
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simply spells out what it means to have tested both subjects by the con91
trolling standard of relevance.

For Westen, to focus on equality when addressing moral and legal
questions confuses matters because equality masquerades itself as an
independent norm and thus hides the nature of the underlying substantive standards and rules that he believed should be the primary focus of moral and legal analyses. In addition,
because the proposition that likes should be treated alike is unquestionably true, it gives an aura of revealed truth to whatever substantive values
it happens to incorporate by reference. As a consequence, values asserted in the form of equality tend to carry greater moral and legal
92
weight than they deserve on their merits.

In Westen’s view, the distortions created by the incorporation of
equality into moral and legal analyses outweigh the rhetorical bene93
fits gained from its deployment.
To come out against the concept of equality in the United States is
akin to criticizing motherhood and apple pie. Not surprisingly,
therefore, it did not take long for other academics to take issue with
many of the points that Westen made in his article. For example,
Professor Erwin Chemerinsky criticized Westen for not distinguishing
between insufficiency and unnecessariness—even if the concept of
equality is insufficient to resolve legal and moral controversies, Chemerinsky pointed out, that does not mean that it is also, as Westen
94
contended, unnecessary.
Specifically, Chemerinsky complained that Westen failed to appreciate the many ways in which equality is necessary: It is morally
necessary because it requires us to care about how people are treated
in relation to one another; it is analytically necessary because it supports a presumption in favor of equal treatment, placing the burden
on those who wish to make distinctions among groups or individuals;
and it is “rhetorically necessary because it is a powerful symbol that
91

92
93

94

Id. at 552–53 (footnote omitted). Westen added that “equality analysis logically collapses
into rights analysis and . . . analyzing legal problems in terms of equality is essentially redundant.” Id. at 560.
Id. at 593 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 542. In responding to some of the critics of his Harvard Law Review article, Westen
explained that he agreed that equality has a “rhetorical force,” but he disagreed that it
was a salutary one because “it comes not from focusing our attention on the considerations that we believe should govern the resolution of normative disputes, but by concealing, obscuring, and confounding them.” Peter Westen, The Meaning of Equality in Law,
Science, Math, and Morals: A Reply, 81 MICH. L. REV. 604, 656–67 (1983). A few years later,
however, Westen conceded that the rhetorical value of equality could be significant. See
WESTEN, supra note 50, at 262–80.
Erwin Chemerinsky, In Defense of Equality: A Reply to Professor Westen, 81 MICH. L. REV. 575,
578–79 (1983).
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helps to persuade decisionmakers to safeguard rights that otherwise
95
would go unprotected.”
Professor Kenneth Karst also took exception to Westen’s contention that there is little of value in the concept of equality. Drawing on
the specifics of American history, including those related to religious
dissent and racial subordination, Karst elaborated on the “emotional
96
pull” of equality. He explained that
[i]n American society the idea of equality means much more than the
formal principle that likes should be treated alike. The inequality that is
on the defensive in America is the idea of caste, of rigid social hierarchy.
When we see people trapped in a system that treats them as inferiors, our
97
emotions are aroused.

Karst added that equality is also analytically useful because it “helps
lawyers and judges to ask the right questions and reach the right solu98
tions.”
Although I agree with Chemerinsky and Karst on the analytical
and rhetorical value of equality, they are not my main concern in this
Article. Instead, my interest here is in what I call “equality’s dependence,” that is, in the way in which judgments that fall outside of egalitarian considerations must be incorporated into the analysis to give
the concept of equality its normative bite. Westen’s article is enlightening in this regard because it is the most comprehensive and persuasive explanation of equality’s dependence in the legal literature.
To further explain what I mean by “equality’s dependence,” it is
helpful to draw on an essay by Professor Kent Greenawalt that was—
like Chemerinsky’s and Karst’s—quite critical of Westen’s article.
Greenawalt took Westen to task for clinging to an unduly formalistic
and narrow understanding of equality. Arguing that the “idea of
equality is much richer than [Westen] acknowledges[,]” Greenawalt
pointed to what he called “substantive principles of equality” that go
beyond the simple mantra that those who are alike ought to be
99
treated alike.
Before turning to one (for our purposes) crucial substantive principle of equality that Greenawalt discusses in his essay, it is important
95

96
97
98
99

Id. at 576 (emphasis omitted); see also Jeremy Waldron, The Substance of Equality, 89 MICH.
L. REV. 1350, 1363–64 (1991) (noting, in a review of Professor Westen’s book, that
“‘[E]quality’ is a useful term . . . , rebutting as it does from the outset any suggestion that
what matters in politics is the ranking or differentiation of human knowledge and intelligence.”).
Karst, supra note 15, at 250.
Id. at 251.
Id. at 250.
Kent Greenawalt, How Empty Is the Idea of Equality?, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1167, 1168 (1983).
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to note a key concession that Greenawalt makes regarding Westen’s
elaboration of what I am calling “equality’s dependence.” “Westen
powerfully reminds us,” Greenawalt wrote, “of a point often made,
rarely challenged directly, but often forgotten: namely, that in the
absence of substantive criteria indicating which people are equal for
particular purposes and what constitutes equal treatment, the formal
principle of equality provides no guidance for how people should be
100
treated.”
In this sentence, Greenawalt acknowledges the notion of equality’s dependence, at least as it applies to formal equality. The reason
why equality’s dependency is, as Greenawalt puts it, “often forgotten”—and I think this is where there is a kernel of truth behind Westen’s skepticism about the normative force of equality—is that we often get so caught up in the seemingly firm moral demands of
equality, that we fail to recognize that it is not a “free-standing” concept, that is, one that is independent of antecedent normative judg101
ments. In emphasizing this point, my objective is not, as it appears
to have been Professor Westen’s, to push equality off of its normative
perch; instead, it is to emphasize that equality’s normative bite is de102
pendent on other (nonegalitarian) values and judgments.
Equality’s dependence is not limited to formal equality principles;
instead, that dependency is also present in more substantive equality
norms that go beyond the idea that those who are alike should be
treated alike. In his essay, Greenawalt discusses one of those norms,
namely, that certain characteristics (such as race and ethnic origin)
should be deemed irrelevant for purposes of distributing rights and
benefits.
100

101
102

Id. at 1169; see also Waldron, supra note 95, at 1352 (noting that “Westen’s argument that
we should always look below the surface of ‘equality’ rhetoric to the substantial claims of
principle that are doing the real work in moral and political debate . . . is an important
argument . . . that . . . helps to clarify much of what is going on in the modern discussion
of discrimination”).
See Larry Alexander & Larry Kress, Against Legal Principles, 82 IOWA L. REV. 739, 755
(1997) (“If ‘equality’ is a value, it is not a free-standing one.”).
See Larry Alexander, Bad Beginnings, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 57, 85 (1996) (“One does not abandon correct moral principles to honor the demands of equality. Rather, one must refer to correct moral principles to know what equality demands.”); Brown, supra note 1, at
1495 (“Unanchored to a source of substantive values, a call for equality does not necessarily guarantee any particular freedoms or opportunities.” (footnote omitted)); Chemerinsky, supra note 94, at 578–79 (“[E]quality depends on other concepts to decide which
differences to strike down and which to uphold.”); Karst, supra note 15, at 249–50 (“The
ideal [of equality] . . . has [a] substantive content; it is a cluster of substantive values, with
moral underpinnings solidly based in a particular society’s religious and philosophical
traditions.” (footnote omitted)); Simons, supra note 50, at 482 (“The idea of equality is a
lens through which we project fundamental social visions.”).
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Oddly, Westen in his article rejects the notion that nondiscrimina103
But Greenawalt
tion norms of this kind are egalitarian in nature.
persuasively argues that
[i]f it is a claim of equality that people similarly subject to an established
standard should be treated the same way (Westen’s version of the formal
principle of equality), surely claims that people should be treated the
same way with regard to one or many benefits or burdens because they
share relevant characteristics, and claims that people should not be denied the same treatment on the basis of irrelevant differences (such as
104
race or gender), are also claims of equality.

In my view, Greenawalt is undoubtedly correct that nondiscrimination norms are properly labeled ones of equality, but the important
point for our purposes is not the lexical one of how to categorize certain norms (e.g., as egalitarian or not); instead, the crucial point is
that the nondiscrimination norm, like that of formal equality, depends on prior judgments regarding the moral (ir)relevance of the
characteristics at issue.
Another way of explaining this is that if we return to Greenawalt’s
excerpt quoted above, the crucial judgment in determining whether
a particular set of individuals should be protected by the norm of
nondiscrimination is whether they “share relevant characteristics”
given the benefit or burden that is subject to distribution. The crucial point to keep in mind is that that assessment is antecedent to the
question of whether the egalitarian norm of nondiscrimination applies.
So, for example, before we can conclude that race should not be
taken into account in the distribution of benefits and burdens, we
need to reach a moral judgment that racial differences are irrelevant

103

104

Westen explained his position as follows:
It would be a mistake . . . to think that . . . notions of racial justice have anything in
particular to do with the idea that likes should be treated alike. They are independent rights, identical in their logic to first amendment rights of speech and religion. Like rights of speech and religion, rights of race and sex can be stated
without reference to “likes” or “equals.”
Westen, supra note 1, at 565. In his later work, Westen modified his view on this point,
acknowledging that “antidiscrimination rights are commonly, and appropriately, referred
to as ‘equality rights.’” WESTEN, supra note 50, at 134. Westen elaborated on his new position as follows:
[A]lthough all rights result in equality, and all such equalities possess the same basic features, antidiscrimination rights are designed to achieve equality in ways that
other rights are not, because unlike other rights, which require single and specified relationships of equality, antidiscrimination rights aim toward, and are satisfied by, any relationship of equality between rightsholders and the persons of
whose treatment their rights are a function.
Id. (footnote omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Greenawalt, supra note 99, at 1180 (footnote omitted).
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for most or all purposes. More specifically, it is only after we reach
the judgment that race, for example, does not impact the abilities,
character, or potential of human beings that we then proceed, as a
matter of morality and law, to discourage the use of race in the distribution of benefits and burdens.
The same analytical framework applies to sexual orientation. The
crucial judgment that must be made when addressing gay rights issues from a nondiscrimination perspective is whether those with a
same-sex sexual orientation differ in abilities, character, or potential
from those with a different-sex sexual orientation (who presumably
have greater access to the benefit, or suffer less from the burden, in
question). And to make that judgment, we must grapple with complicated normative questions regarding human sexuality and intimate
105
relationships.
Take, for example, the issue of same-sex relationships and their
legal recognition. It may seem at first glance that the question of
whether the State should treat same-sex relationships in the same way
that it treats different-sex ones is primarily (or even entirely) one of
equality. But before we can establish what equality demands, we must
first determine whether it applies. And in answering that antecedent
question, we must look outside of equality considerations. In the
specific context of the legal recognition of intimate relationships, we
need to determine the relevant characteristics for deciding whether
same-sex relationships are sufficiently similar to their heterosexual
counterparts so as to render appropriate the application of equality
106
principles.
There will be disagreements, of course, on which characteristics
should be deemed relevant. Some may argue that it is the degree of
commitment among gay couples that should matter, while others may
point to their willingness to abide by monogamy precepts while yet
others may emphasize parenting attributes. (And some may want to
emphasize all—or none of—these factors.) But the key point is that
the choice of the relevant criteria is not driven by egalitarian consid105

106

Shannon Minter has expressed a similar view, noting that
[i]n the context of gay rights, courts and others must make normative judgments . . . about whether sexual orientation is a permissible basis for unequal
treatment . . . . To make those substantive determinations, courts and legislators,
as well as voters, ultimately must rely on substantive norms. There is no shortcut
around those normative judgments based on purportedly neutral principles, selfevident facts or . . . a purely procedural account of fairness.
Minter, supra note 6, at 115–16 (footnote omitted).
I return to this issue below in exploring how courts have applied equality principles in
determining the constitutionality of same-sex marriage bans. See infra notes 167–99 and
accompanying text.
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erations. Those considerations come into the analysis only if and
when we are persuaded that there are no relevant differences between gay and straight couples for purposes of state recognition of
sexually intimate relationships. Equality considerations do not help
us determine which similarities (or differences) are relevant.
In short, to reach the normative conclusion that lesbians and gay
men ought to be treated like heterosexuals (or to put it differently,
that sexual orientation should be an irrelevant criterion in the distribution of particular benefits and burdens), we need to make antecedent normative assessments that fall outside of equality’s domain.
Equality’s dependence belies the notion that equality is a more
“self-contained” constitutional norm than liberty, that is, a norm that
allows judges to decide cases without bringing to bear their normative
assessments regarding disputed moral and policy issues. As I noted in
the Introduction, it seems to be widely assumed that substantive due
process doctrine encourages (or allows) judges to rely on their per107
sonal values in ways that equality principles do not. It is thought, in
other words, that the norm of equality constrains judges’ discretion
in ways that the norm of liberty does not. I do not believe that this is
the case. In the next section, I provide specific examples of the similar normative judgments that courts have reached while engaging in
both liberty and equality reviews of gay rights claims to support my
view.
II. NORMATIVE ASSESSMENTS IN GAY RIGHTS CONSTITUTIONAL CASES
It is in some ways not surprising that equality review is thought to
be more neutral (or less normatively substantive) than liberty review.
The latter, after all, has revolved around the notion of fundamental
rights, that is, of those rights that (however defined and determined)
represent historical (or evolving or enduring) values that serve as a
normative baseline through which to assess the constitutionality of
108
legislation that impacts on considerations of privacy and autonomy.
In contrast, equal protection review is thought to avoid similar value
choices because the crucial issue in equality cases is not whether the
109
government can regulate in a certain area but how it does so. This

107
108
109

See supra notes 19–25 and accompanying text.
See generally Conkle, supra note 14.
See Minter, supra note 6, at 106 (“Deeming certain rights ‘fundamental’ in effect says to
the people or the legislature, ‘You may not go beyond these substantive boundaries.’ In
contrast, the principle of equal protection says, ‘You may set the boundaries where you
like, but you must set them equally for everyone.’” (footnote omitted)).
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analytical framework provides equality review with an aura of proceduralism that immunizes it against some of the strongest and fiercest
criticisms aimed at liberty review.
That aura of proceduralism has only been made brighter by John
Hart Ely’s widely discussed ideas regarding how judicial review can be
understood in ways that are consistent with democratic theory. Ely’s
key contribution was to conceive of judicial review, properly understood, as interested not in “the substantive merits” for or against the
challenged legislation but in “questions of participation,” that is, in
the extent to which the courts are confident that legislators accounted for the interests of all citizens in enacting the legislation in
110
question.
Ely believed that the Equal Protection Clause was particularly well
suited for this type of procedural and representation-reinforcing un111
derstanding of judicial review.
As Professor Jane Schacter puts it,
“Ely’s theory of ‘representation reinforcement’. . . . has been offered
as an appealing way to operationalize equal protection guarantees
without dragging courts into endlessly contested debates about subs112
tantive values and ideas.” What Ely failed to account for, however,

110

111

112



ELY, supra note 12, at 181. Ely elaborated on this point as follows:
[C]ontrary to the standard characterization of the Constitution as “an enduring
but evolving statement of general values,” . . . the selection and accommodation of
substantive values is left almost entirely to the political process and instead the
document is overwhelmingly concerned, on the one hand, with procedural fairness in the resolution of individual disputes (process writ small), and on the other,
with what might capaciously be designated process writ large—with ensuring
broad participation in the processes and distributions of government.
Id. at 87 (footnotes omitted); see also id. at 100–01 (“The general strategy has . . . not been
to root in the document a set of substantive rights entitled to permanent protection. The
Constitution has instead proceeded from the quite reasonable assumption that an effective majority will not inordinately threaten its own rights, and has sought to assure that
such a majority not systematically treat others less well than it treats itself . . . .”).
Id. at 82 (arguing that the “Equal Protection Clause is obviously our Constitution’s most
dramatic embodiment of th[e] ideal” that elected officials should represent the interests
of the entire community and not only of a few). Professor Jane Schacter has summarized
Ely’s understanding of the role of equal protection in achieving the objectives of judicial
review as follows:
Ely recast constitutional equality protections as consistent—not in tension—with
democracy by identifying inequality born of social “prejudice” as democracy’s nemesis. Positing that “prejudice is a lens that distorts reality,” Ely enlisted judges in
the enterprise of political process perfection—that is, in self-consciously correcting
for the ways that prejudice compromises the democratic process . . . . Seen in these
terms, equality-enhancing judicial review enables democracy rather than applies a
brake on it.
Jane S. Schacter, Romer v. Evans and Democracy’s Domain, 50 VAND. L. REV. 361, 390–91
(1997) (footnotes omitted).
Jane S. Schacter, Ely at the Altar: Political Process Theory Through the Lens of the Marriage Debate, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1363, 1364 (2011). Professor Schacter adds that
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was the extent to which the application of the principle of equality is
itself dependent on the types of substantive normative judgments that
113
he thought was best to keep outside of judicial review’s domain.
Now that we have an idea, from the previous section, of what
equality’s dependence is all about, we can turn our attention to specific examples, in the context of gay rights constitutional litigation, of
the similar ways in which judges rely on normative assessments to decide both liberty and equality claims. My objective here is not just to
show that both liberty and equality review call for the making of
normative judgments; instead, my aim is to also illustrate how the nature of those judgments in the two categories of cases is quite similar.
A. Gay Rights Liberty Cases
Over the last few decades, the most persistent question related to
the liberty rights of gay people under the Constitution has arisen in
the context of the State’s authority to criminalize consensual samesex sexual intimacy. For that reason, I begin below with an exploration of how different Supreme Court Justices have normatively
tackled that question at different times. I then proceed to consider
the types of normative judgments that judges have made in determining whether same-sex marriage bans are consistent with considerations of constitutional liberty.

113

Ely was animated by a desire to avoid constitutional rules that placed judges in
what he regarded as the democratically dangerous position of making contested
choices based on the open-textured language in the Constitution. Thus, he offered up his principles as matters of neutral process that could be employed without the need to adjudicate controversial normative debates.
Id. at 1371.
Several commentators, in critiquing Ely’s process theory of constitutional law, have noted
the extent to which the Constitution inescapably calls for the application of substantive
values. See Daniel R. Ortiz, Pursuing a Perfect Politics, The Allure and Failure of Process Theory,
77 VA. L. REV. 721, 722 (1991) (“At some level in any constitutional theory, the substantive judgments Ely purports to eschew must enter into the analysis.”); Laurence H. Tribe,
The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063, 1064 (1980)
(“The process theme by itself determines almost nothing unless its presuppositions are
specified, and its content supplemented, by a full theory of substantive rights and values—the very sort of theory the process-perfecters are at such pains to avoid.”) (I discuss
Tribe’s critique of process-based theories of constitutional law in infra notes 214–21 and
accompanying text.); see also Paul Brest, The Substance of Process, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 131, 131
(1981) (“[M]ost instances of representation-reinforcing review demand value judgments
not different in kind or scope from the fundamental values sort.”).
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1. Sodomy Cases
Although contemporary substantive due process rights are usually
114
traced back to a couple of parenting cases from the 1920s, the constitutional right to privacy and personal autonomy in matters related
to sexual intimacy was first articulated by Justice John Harlan in his
115
1961 dissent in Poe v. Ullman. At issue in Poe was the constitutionality of a Connecticut statute that criminalized the use of contracep116
tives.
The Court refused to reach the merits of the case on the
ground that, since it was unlikely that the statute would be enforced
117
against the plaintiffs, which included a married couple, the lawsuit
118
Justice Harlan, after disadid not raise a justiciable controversy.
greeing with the Court on the justiciability issue, proceeded to address the merits of the plaintiffs’ constitutional claim, one grounded
119
in substantive due process.
In concluding that the statute was unconstitutional, Harlan emphasized two points. The first was the degree of governmental intrusion into the intimate decisions of couples—including married
ones—that was required in order to successfully investigate and prosecute the crime. The enforcement of the contraception statute, Harlan noted, “is an intolerable and unjustifiable invasion of privacy in
the conduct of the most intimate concerns of an individual’s personal
120
life.”
Harlan’s second concern was that the statute intruded into the
home, a site that he believed was protected not only by the Fourth
Amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures, but also by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Liberty Clause. As Harlan put it,
“the enactment involves what, by common understanding throughout
the English-speaking world, must be granted to be a most fundamental aspect of ‘liberty,’ the privacy of the home in its most basic sense,

114

115
116
117
118
119
120

Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (invalidating a law requiring children to
attend public schools based on parents’ liberty right to make important decisions about
their welfare); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (striking down a law prohibiting
teaching foreign languages to children based on parents’ liberty right to control their
education).
367 U.S. 497 (1961).
Also at issue in the case was a second statute that prohibited the giving of medical advice
about the use of contraceptives. Id. at 498.
Id.
Id. at 507–08.
Id. at 522 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 539.
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and it is this which requires that the statute be subjected to ‘strict
121
scrutiny.’”
Notice that both of Harlan’s concerns about the contraception
law could have been used to question the constitutionality of sodomy
statutes, which, at the time the Poe lawsuit was brought, were in place
122
in every state of the union.
None of those statutes made distinc123
tions based on either the marital status or gender of the parties.
What they did do was authorize the State to bring to bear its investigatory and prosecutorial powers on the intimate relationships of individuals, including married couples. Sodomy laws were, in this sense,
no different from the contraception statute at issue in Poe. In addition, it is reasonable to believe that sodomy statutes were most frequently violated in private homes, the site that, according to Harlan,
124
was entitled to special constitutional protection.
Despite the fact that sodomy statutes raised constitutional concerns that were similar to those raised by Connecticut’s contraception
statute, Harlan left little doubt that his understanding of constitutional liberty did not immunize consensual same-sex sexual conduct
from criminal prosecution, even when such conduct took place in the
125
otherwise constitutionally privileged site of the home.
Harlan did
not explain why he believed that consensual gay sex was different
from heterosexual sex by married couples, except to make the descriptive observation that society’s legal rules and moral norms dis126
couraged the former and encouraged the latter.
But Harlan did
feel it necessary to explain that “not to discriminate between what is involved in this case and . . . the traditional offenses against good mor121
122
123
124
125

126

Id. at 548 (citation omitted).
Illinois in 1961 became the first state to repeal its sodomy statute. BALL, supra note 75, at
208.
See id.
See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
Poe, 367 U.S. at 552 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“I would not suggest that adultery, homosexuality, fornication and incest are immune from criminal enquiry, however privately practiced.”).
Harlan explained that,
[t]he laws regarding marriage which provide both when the sexual powers may be
used and the legal and societal context in which children are born and brought
up, as well as laws forbidding adultery, fornication and homosexual practices
which express the negative of the proposition, confining sexuality to lawful marriage, form a pattern so deeply pressed into the substance of our social life that
any Constitutional doctrine in this area must build upon that basis.
Id. at 546 (citation omitted); see also id. at 553 (“Adultery, homosexuality and the like are
sexual intimacies which the State forbids altogether, but the intimacy of husband and
wife is necessarily an essential and accepted feature of the institution of marriage, an institution which the State not only must allow, but which always and in every age it has fostered and protected.”).
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als or crimes [including homosexuality] which . . . may . . . happen to
have been committed or concealed in the home, would entirely mis127
conceive the argument that is being made.”
The Supreme Court, of course, eventually disagreed with Harlan’s
128
position on the constitutionality of sodomy statutes, but for our
present purposes what is important is that Harlan believed that the
sexual orientation of individuals was a relevant consideration in determining the scope and applicability of the Liberty Clause in matters
related to sexual intimacy.
Although Harlan did not elaborate on his view regarding the relevancy of sexual orientation for substantive due process purposes, the
same cannot be said of the Supreme Court’s decision in Bowers v.
129
Hardwick.
In the twenty-five years between Poe and Hardwick, the
Supreme Court struck down the same Connecticut statute at issue in
130
the former case as applied to married couples, held that unmarried
131
couples have a constitutional right to use contraceptives, and constitutionally protected a woman’s decision to terminate a pregnan132
But according to the Hardwick Court, whatever constitutional
cy.
protection applied to the choices of heterosexuals in exercising their
133
sexuality, it was unavailable to lesbians and gay men.
It is clear, for several reasons, that the Hardwick Court found the
sexual orientation of individuals to be constitutionally relevant when
interpreting the meaning of the Liberty Clause. First, even though
the Georgia statute at issue did not distinguish between same-sex and
134
different-sex sodomy, the Court viewed the case exclusively through
the prism of homosexuality without once addressing how the statute
might impact heterosexuals. Second, as noted earlier, the Court
framed the issue narrowly by asking whether one category of individuals (i.e., gay people) have a fundamental right to engage in particular sexual acts rather than by inquiring whether all individuals, regardless of sexual orientation, have the right to make decisions
135
related to sexual intimacy without state interference.
And finally,
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135



Id. at 553 (emphasis added).
See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
478 U.S. 186 (1986).
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194 (1986) (claiming that a fundamental right to engage in gay sex “is, at best, facetious”).
Id. at 188 n.1.
See supra note 80 and accompanying text. Professor Laurence Tribe has noted that
“Georgia’s brief . . . encouraged the Court’s recasting of the right at issue, denouncing
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while the Court viewed heterosexuals as individuals who marry, form
families, and procreate, it saw gay people as defined solely through
136
As the Court put it,
their interest in engaging in sodomous acts.
“we think it evident that none of the rights announced in [the
Court’s prior substantive due process cases] bears any resemblance to
the claimed constitutional right of homosexuals to engage in acts of
137
sodomy that is asserted in this case.”
In sharp contrast, Justice Harry Blackmun in his dissent concluded that the sexual orientation of Michael Hardwick—the gay
man arrested in his Atlanta apartment for having consensual sex with
138
another man —was wholly irrelevant to the constitutional analysis.
Blackmun criticized the majority for “its almost obsessive focus on
139
homosexual activity.” After noting that the sodomy statute in question applied to everyone regardless of sexual orientation, Blackmun
explained that “[u]nlike the Court, the Georgia Legislature has not
proceeded on the assumption that homosexuals are so different from
other citizens that their lives may be controlled in a way that would
140
not be tolerated if it limited the choices of those other citizens.”
As Blackmun saw it, the Georgia sodomy statute violated the Liberty Clause because it interfered with the ability of all individuals—
regardless of sexual orientation—to define themselves in important
ways through their choices regarding sexually intimate relation141
ships. “In a Nation as diverse as ours,” Blackmun explained, “there
may be many ‘right’ ways of conducting those relationships,
and . . . much of the richness of a relationship will come from the
freedom an individual has to choose the form and nature of these in142
tensely personal bonds.” From Blackmun’s perspective, Hardwick’s

136
137

138
139
140
141

142

homosexual sodomy as ‘purely an unnatural means of satisfying an unnatural lust.’”
Tribe, supra note 34, at 1900–01 (quoting Brief of Petitioner at 27, Bowers v. Hardwick,
478 U.S. 186 (1986) (No. 85–140), 1985 WL 667939).
Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 191 (concluding that there was “[n]o connection between family,
marriage, or procreation on the one hand and homosexual activity on the other”).
Id. at 190–91. The Lawrence Court castigated the Hardwick majority for its unduly narrow
view of gay people: “To say that the issue in [Hardwick] was simply the right to engage in
certain sexual conduct demeans the claim the individual put forward, just as it would demean a married couple were it to be said marriage is simply about the right to have sexual
intercourse.” Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003).
On the events leading up to Hardwick’s arrest, see BALL, supra note 75, at 12–13.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 200 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Id. (citation omitted).
Id. at 205 (“[S]exual intimacy is a sensitive, key relationship of human existence, central
to family life, community welfare, and the development of human personality . . . . [I]ndividuals define themselves in a significant way through their intimate sexual
relationships . . . .”) (citations omitted)).
Id. (citations omitted).
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constitutional claim involving his rights of privacy and autonomy
143
were “not depend[ent] in any way on his sexual orientation.”
Seventeen years after Hardwick, the Supreme Court, in Lawrence v.
144
Texas, came around to adopting Justice Blackmun’s view that a
claimant’s same-sex sexual orientation should be irrelevant in determining the scope and applicability of the Liberty Clause. For the
Hardwick majority, the decision to engage in gay sexual intimacy was
constitutionally unprotected even if the conduct took place within
145
the private confines of the home.
But for the Lawrence Court, the
sexual orientation of adults who choose to have sexual relationships
in private was irrelevant. What now mattered constitutionally was that
sodomy statutes “touch . . . upon the most private human conduct,
sexual behavior, and in the most private of places, the home. The
statutes . . . seek to control a personal relationship that . . . is within
the liberty of persons to choose without being punished as crimi146
nals.”
Rather than focusing on the parties’ sexual orientation, the Lawrence Court focused on the autonomy- and dignity-based interests that
all individuals share when making the exceedingly personal decision
147
of choosing sexual partners. Indeed, the Lawrence Court, unlike the
Hardwick Court, drew a normative connection between same-sex sexual conduct and the committed relationships that can accompany it.
Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing for the majority in Lawrence, recognized that the criminalization of particular kinds of sexual intimacy
not only limits the ability of individuals to decide which kinds of sexual acts to engage in and with whom; it also restricts their ability to
build relationships that are based, in part, upon that sexual intima148
cy. Thus, Kennedy noted that “[w]hen sexuality finds overt expression in intimate conduct with another person, the conduct can be but
143

144
145
146
147

148

Id. at 201; see also id. at 206 (“The Court claims that its decision today merely refuses to
recognize a fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy; what the Court really
has refused to recognize is the fundamental interest all individuals have in controlling the
nature of their intimate associations with others.”).
539 U.S. 558 (2003).
See Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 194–96.
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567.
The rights protected by the Liberty Clause, the Court explained, “involv[e] the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal
dignity and autonomy . . . . Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of
personhood were they formed under compulsion of the State.” Id. at 574 (quoting
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992)). The Court
then added that “[p]ersons in a homosexual relationship may seek autonomy for these
purposes, just as heterosexual persons do.” Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574.
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567.
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one element in a personal bond that is more enduring.” In short,
while the Hardwick Court was unwilling to see gay people as more
than the sum total of their interests in engaging in particular sexual
150
acts, the Lawrence Court saw gay people as fuller human beings.
We are not here interested in whether the Hardwick Court and
Justice Harlan in his Poe dissent on the one hand or the Lawrence
Court and Justice Blackmun in his Hardwick dissent on the other had
the better arguments regarding the proper understanding of substantive due process in matters related to sexual conduct. Instead, our
interest is in the crucial role that the Justices’ normative assessments
regarding the (ir)relevancy of sexual orientation for purposes of determining the scope of liberty rights, and regarding the connection
between having a same-sex sexuality and the ability to enter into important and dignity-conferring relationships, played in their respective interpretations of the proper scope of the Liberty Clause.
It can be argued that it is precisely these types of normative assessments that help make the doctrine of substantive due process so
problematic. This is because it may seem that judges, in determining
the meaning of the Liberty Clause, bring to bear their personal views
about the very moral and policy issues that are in play when the State
considers whether to criminalize consensual sodomy. Indeed, none
of the four decisions discussed in this section—the majority opinions
in Hardwick and Lawrence, as well as Harlan’s dissent in Poe and
Blackmun’s in Hardwick—pointed to any specific evidence (in the
record or otherwise) to support or justify their normative assessments
regarding the relevancy of sexual orientation in determining the
scope of the State’s constitutional authority to criminalize consensual
sexual conduct. This may suggest that those assessments were in
some sense “extra-judicial,” that is, based on the judges’ personal
views—perhaps grounded in their general knowledge about (homo)sexuality as well as in their particular knowledge (or lack thereof)
of specific gay people—about sexual orientation.
As I will attempt to show in Part II.B, however, judges deciding gay
rights cases under equal protection principles reach similar normative assessments, sometimes in the same seemingly “extra-judicial”
151
manner.
This suggests that there may be nothing particularly
unique or troubling about the kinds of normative assessments that
149
150

151

Id.
I further explore the way in which the Lawrence Court understood gay people and their
relationships in Carlos A. Ball, The Positive in the Fundamental Right to Marry: Same-Sex Marriage in the Aftermath of Lawrence v. Texas, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1184, 1212–15 (2004).
See infra notes 172–74 and accompanying text.
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judges make while engaging in liberty review. But before grappling
with questions of equality, it is helpful to first explore how courts
have assessed the constitutionality of another crucial gay rights issue,
that of same-sex marriage bans, under liberty principles.
2. Same-Sex Marriage
Like sodomy statutes, same-sex marriage bans have been chal152
The threshold queslenged on substantive due process grounds.
tion in these cases, as in the sodomy ones, has been how to define the
fundamental right that may be at issue. The plaintiffs in the marriage
cases have argued that the fundamental right to marry is broad
153
enough to include same-sex couples.
In particular, they have
claimed that the right, at its core, is about protecting the interests of
154
all individuals to choose the person whom they want to marry. For
their part, the states have contended that while there is a fundamen155
156
tal right to marry, it is not available to same-sex couples.
In order for courts to decide whether same-sex couples enjoy a
constitutional right to marry, they must first make normative assess157
ments about what are the principal purposes of marriage. If those
purposes are correlated in some appreciable ways to the uniqueness
of heterosexual unions (however that uniqueness is defined), then it
makes sense to understand the fundamental right at issue not as a
general right of everyone (regardless of sexual orientation) to marry
152

153

154

155

156
157

See, e.g., In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008); Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub.
Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008); Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941
(Mass. 2003); Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196 (N.J. 2006).
See, e.g., Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571, 619 (Md. 2007) (“Appellees argue that we
should not be concerned with whether the Court should recognize a new fundamental
right to same-sex marriage, but instead should focus on whether the existing fundamental
right to marriage should be extended to include same-sex couples.”).
See, e.g., Lewis, 908 A.2d at 206 (“Plaintiffs contend that the right to marry a person of the
same sex is a fundamental right [and] . . . . that the liberty interest at stake is ‘the right of
every adult to choose whom to marry without intervention of government.’”); Andersen v.
King Cnty., 138 P.3d 963, 976 (Wash. 2006) (“Plaintiffs maintain they have the fundamental right to marry the person of their choice.”).
The most important Supreme Court cases on the fundamental right to marry are Turner
v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987) (invalidating regulation prohibiting prisoners from marrying), and Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (striking down antimiscegenation statute
on equal protection and due process grounds). The Court also discussed the fundamental right to marry in Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978), but it decided that case—
which involved a statute prohibiting individuals who owed child support from marrying—
on equal protection, rather than on substantive due process, grounds.
See, e.g., Andersen, 138 P.3d at 976 (“While the State agrees that marriage is a fundamental
right, it says that it does not include same-sex marriage.”).
See infra notes 158–62 and accompanying text.
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the person of their choice but instead as the right of heterosexuals to
have their (unique) relationships validated and supported through
the institution of marriage.
It can be argued that when courts conclude that same-sex couples
do not enjoy a fundamental right to marry because the right to marry
is limited to heterosexual couples, they engage in conclusory reasoning. But the reasoning is not conclusory if it is accompanied by normative assessments regarding the principal purposes of marriages. If
those assessments lead courts to conclude, for example, that the
principal purposes of marriage are to promote procreation and to
encourage the raising of children by dual-gender couples, then an
understanding of the fundamental right to marry as limited to different-sex couples is a defensible position to take. It is noteworthy in
this regard that some state supreme courts, in rejecting the idea that
the fundamental right to marry applies to same-sex couples, have
pointed to the fact that the Supreme Court has only spoken of the
158
right to marry in cases involving different-sex couples.
A key normative assessment that is part of the constitutional analysis of same-sex marriage bans under liberty review (as it is under
159
equality review, as we will see in the next section), then, is a determination of what are the essential purposes of marriage. It is no
coincidence that the California Supreme Court, the only appellate
court which has held that the fundamental right to marry (in this
case, under the state constitution) is sufficiently capacious to include
same-sex couples, is also the only appellate court that, as part of its
liberty analysis, has explicitly concluded that marriage is not primarily

158

159

See, e.g., Conaway, 932 A.2d at 619 (noting that all of the Supreme Court’s marriage “cases
infer that the right to marry enjoys its fundamental status due to the male-female nature
of the relationship and/or the attendant link to fostering procreation of our species”);
Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 14 (N.Y. 2006) (“While many U.S. Supreme Court
decisions recognize marriage as a fundamental right protected under the Due Process
Clause, all of these cases understood the marriage right as involving a union of one woman and one man.” (citations omitted)). Several courts have also concluded that the absence of same-sex marriages in American history means that lesbian and gay couples do
not have a constitutional right to marry. See, e.g., Standhardt v. Superior Court ex rel. Cnty. of Maricopa, 77 P.3d 451, 459 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003) (“[S]ame-sex marriages are neither deeply rooted in the legal and social history of our Nation or state nor are they implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.”); Lewis, 908 A.2d at 208, 211 (noting that “the
liberty interest at stake is not some undifferentiated, abstract right to marriage, but rather
the right of people of the same sex to marry,” and then concluding that “a right to samesex marriage is [not] so deeply rooted in the traditions, history, and conscience of the
people of this State that it ranks as a fundamental right”); Andersen, 138 P.3d at 978 (noting that there is not “a tradition or history of same-sex marriage in this state”).
See infra notes 181–86 and accompanying text.
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160

about procreation and dual-gender parenting. Instead, the court in
161
In Re Marriage Cases ruled that the core purpose of marriage is to
provide public recognition of the life-long commitment that individuals choose to make with another as part of an intimate relationship.
As the court put it, “the right to marry represents the right of an individual to establish a legally recognized family with the person of one’s
choice, and, as such, is of fundamental significance both to society
162
and to the individual.”
But the California court’s liberty analysis in In re Marriage Cases did
not (and could not) end with the making of a normative judgment
about the principal purpose of marriage. This is because it still had
to grapple with the (again) normative question of whether sexual
orientation was relevant to the scope and applicability of the fundamental right to marry. That is, once the court concluded that the
principal purpose of marriage is to provide social support for the de160

161

162

Other appellate courts have reached similar conclusions, but they have done so as part of
their equality (as opposed to liberty) review of same-sex marriage bans. See Kerrigan v.
Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 424–25 n.19 (Conn. 2008) (“[E]ven though procreative conduct plays an important role in many marriages, we do not believe that such
conduct so defines the institution of marriage that the inability to engage in that conduct
is determinative of whether same sex and opposite sex couples are similarly situated for
equal protection purposes . . . .”); Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 883 (Iowa 2009)
(“[O]ur marriage laws are rooted in the necessity of providing an institutional basis for
defining the fundamental relational rights and responsibilities of persons in organized
society . . . . [They] also serve to recognize the status of the parties’ committed relationship.”) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008). A few months after the California high court issued its opinion,
state voters approved Proposition 8, a constitutional amendment banning same-sex marriages. The following year, the same court upheld that amendment on state constitutional grounds. See Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48 (Cal. 2009). But a year after that, a federal
district court struck down Proposition 8 on federal constitutional grounds. Perry v.
Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 423 (footnote omitted). The California Supreme Court’s
opinion in In Re Marriage Cases is particularly helpful for our purposes because it distinguished the due process analysis from the equality one. In contrast, the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court’s ruling in Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 968
(Mass. 2003), which also struck down the state’s same-sex marriage ban, is less helpful for
our purposes because it provided a unitary analysis—that is, one that did not separate liberty considerations from equality ones—after concluding that the liberty and equality
concerns raised by the ban overlapped. See id. at 953 (“In matters implicating marriage,
family life, and the upbringing of children, the two constitutional concepts [of liberty and
equality] frequently overlap, as they do here.”). It bears noting, however, that the Massachusetts court, like the California one, staked out a clearly normative position on the central purpose of marriage. As the Massachusetts court saw it, “it is the exclusive and permanent commitment of the marriage partners to one another, not the begetting of
children, that is the sine qua non of civil marriage.” Id. at 961 (footnote omitted); see also
id. at 955 (“Because it fulfills yearnings for security, safe haven, and connection that express our common humanity, civil marriage is an esteemed institution, and the decision
whether and whom to marry is among life’s momentous acts of self-definition.”).
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cision of an individual to enter into a committed and loving relationship with another, it then had to determine whether gay people in
particular are capable of entering and remaining in those relationships. The California court answered that key question in the affirmative after concluding that “[t]he capability of gay individuals to enter into loving and enduring relationships [is] comparable to those
163
entered into by heterosexuals.” The court added that “an individual’s homosexual orientation is not a constitutionally legitimate basis
164
In
for withholding or restricting the individual’s legal rights.”
reaching this conclusion, the court embraced the normative view that
“homosexuality [is] simply one of the numerous variables of our
165
common and diverse humanity.”
We are not here interested in the merits of the California court’s
normative assessments. Instead, we are interested in the nature of
those assessments in order to compare them with the types of judgments that courts make in gay rights constitutional cases when engaging in equality review. As we will see in the next section, there are
significant similarities between the two.
B. Gay Rights Equality Cases
My discussion so far of how judges rely on normative assessments
in determining the scope and applicability of the Liberty Clause in
gay rights cases might seem to support the view that substantive due
process is a less legitimate basis for striking down legislation than are
principles of equality. After all, as we have seen, a critical part of the
constitutional analysis in those cases is predicated on judges’ normative assessments of questions such as the relevancy of sexual orientation in public policy matters, the purpose of the institution of marriage, and the capabilities of gay people to form committed
163

164
165

In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 428. It is worth noting that the California court in In re
Marriage Cases relied heavily on the actions of the legislature—including its enactment of
sexual orientation antidiscrimination laws and of a comprehensive domestic partnership
law—to reach its normative conclusion about the relationship-related capabilities of lesbians and gay men. As the court explained,
[t]his state’s current policies and conduct regarding homosexuality recognize that
gay individuals are entitled to the same legal rights and the same respect and dignity afforded all other individuals and are protected from discrimination on the
basis of their sexual orientation, and, more specifically, recognize that gay individuals are fully capable of entering into the kind of loving and enduring committed
relationships that may serve as the foundation of a family and of responsibly caring
for and raising children.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
Id. at 429 (citations omitted).
Id. at 428.
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relationships. However, as I explain in this section of the Article,
which discusses same-sex marriage (from an equality perspective) and
166
the Supreme Court’s opinion in Romer v. Evans, equality review in
gay rights cases requires judges to make similar normative assessments.
1. Same-Sex Marriage
Most of the state supreme courts that have struck down same-sex
marriage bans have done so not on the basis of substantive due
167
process but on that of equality.
In doing so, they have made normative assessments that are strikingly similar to those reached by the
California court in In re Marriage Cases when it determined the validity
of same-sex marriage bans through the lens of constitutional liberty.
In the Connecticut same-sex marriage litigation, for example, the
government took the position that the state constitution’s equal protection provision could not grant relief to the plaintiffs because samesex couples and different-sex ones are not similarly situated. Specifically, the government contended that “the conduct that the[] [plaintiffs] seek to engage in—marrying someone of the same sex—is fundamentally different from the conduct in which opposite sex couples
168
seek to engage.”
This argument proved untenable to the Connecticut Supreme
Court because, in its view, “[t]he plaintiffs . . . share the same interest
in a committed and loving relationship as heterosexual persons who
wish to marry, and they share the same interest in having a family and

166
167

168

517 U.S. 620 (1996).
See Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008) (holding that state’s
same-sex marriage ban violates equal protection considerations while not reaching the
due process claim); Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993) (rejecting due process challenge to same-sex marriage ban but holding that it classified individuals according to
their sex and thus requiring the application of heightened scrutiny under equal protection principles); Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009) (striking down same-sex
marriage ban on equal protection grounds while not reaching liberty claim); Lewis v.
Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 211 (N.J. 2006) (rejecting plaintiffs’ due process challenge to samesex marriage ban but holding that equal protection considerations require the state to
provide the same rights and benefits to same-sex couples that it provides to heterosexual,
married couples); Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 887 (Vt. 1999) (holding that equality provision of state constitution requires the government to offer same-sex couples the same
rights and benefits afforded to married heterosexual couples, but not reaching plaintiffs’
other claims). The other two state supreme courts that have sided with the plaintiffs in
challenges to same-sex marriage bans have accepted their liberty and equality claims. See
In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 384; Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941
(Mass. 2003).
Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 424.
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raising their children in a loving and supportive environment.”
The court added that same-sex couples share with opposite sex ones
“fundamental and overriding similarities . . . both with regard to mat170
ters relating to family and in all other respects.”
As we have seen,
this was the same understanding of gay people and their relationships
articulated by the California court in In re Marriage Cases as it grappled with substantive due process doctrine in the context of the
171
state’s same-sex marriage ban.
Interestingly, although the Connecticut court, a little later in its
opinion, repeated that same-sex and different-sex couples have “a
multitude of characteristics . . . in common,” it did not elaborate on
the nature of those characteristics beyond its earlier conclusion that
the two groups shared similar interests in having committed and lov172
ing relationships and families. Indeed, the court did not say much
about the bases for its assessment regarding the characteristics and
attributes of gay people and their relationships, other than to note
that the Connecticut legislature had enacted a civil unions law recog173
nizing their committed relationships.
In this sense, it can be argued that the court’s normative assessments of gay people and their
relationships were “extra-judicial” in the same way that U.S. Supreme
Court Justices seemingly reached normative assessments about gay
people in the sodomy cases (discussed in Part II.A.1) without explain174
ing how and why they did so.
It might be reasonable to expect a court like the Connecticut Supreme Court to be more forthcoming about its reasons for reaching
certain conclusions regarding the capabilities and attributes of the
group raising an equality claim in court. On the other hand, we

169

170
171
172
173
174

Id. Like the state in the Connecticut same-sex marriage case, one of the defendants in
the California case argued that the equal protection claim should be rejected because
same-sex couples and different-sex ones are not similarly situated. The California Supreme Court disagreed by noting that the two sets of couples sought marriage for the
same reasons. The court explained that
[b]oth groups at issue consist of pairs of individuals who wish to enter into a formal, legally binding and officially recognized, long-term family relationship that
affords the same rights and privileges and imposes the same obligations and responsibilities. Under these circumstances, there is no question but that these two
categories of individuals are sufficiently similar to bring into play equal protection
principles that require a court to determine whether distinctions between the two
groups justify the unequal treatment.
In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 435 n.54 (citations omitted).
Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 424 n.19.
See supra notes 162–64 and accompanying text.
Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 424.
See id.
See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
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would not necessarily expect courts that might be called upon, for
example, to assess the capabilities of racial minorities—or of men or
women generally—to enter into loving and committed relationships
to provide extensive explanations and support for the proposition
that the group raising the equality claim is similarly situated to other
groups when it comes to their reasons for seeking marriage licenses.
It may be that assessments regarding the (ir)relevancy of sexual
orientation for many (if not all) public policy purposes may be no
different (and do not require more justification) than assessments
regarding the (ir)relevancy of race and gender.
Of course, the fact that a judge’s views about the relevancy of sexual orientation for public policy purposes might impact her willingness to accept (or not) a constitutional challenge to a law that treats
individuals differently according to that characteristic is hardly surprising, in the same way that a judge’s views on racial subordination
and gender relations likely affect her assessment of race- and genderbased discrimination claims. My point is simply that the types of socalled subjective views on sexual orientation that judges bring to bear
in liberty and equality gay rights constitutional cases are quite similar.
Indeed, what is crucial for our purposes is to note the similarity between the normative assessment about gay people and their relationships reached by the Connecticut Supreme Court while engaged in
175
equality review of its state’s same-sex marriage ban and that made
by the California Supreme Court while engaged in its liberty review of
176
the same kind of ban.
The similarities in the types of normative judgments brought to
bear under both forms of judicial review is due in large part to equality’s dependence, that is, to the fact that judgments which fall outside
of egalitarian considerations must be incorporated into the analysis
177
to give the concept of equality its normative bite. In the end, those
judgments are not terribly different from the types of “subjective” assessments regarding considerations of morals and policy called for by
178
liberty review.
To help explain this point, we can turn to the Iowa Supreme
Court’s decision in Varnum v. Brien, a ruling that relied on equal protection considerations to strike down the state’s same-sex marriage
179
ban.
The government in Varnum argued that the ability of differ175
176
177
178
179

See supra notes 169–74 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 163–65 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 98–107 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 157–65 and accompanying text.
763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009).
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ent-sex couples “to procreate naturally,” and the inability of same-sex
couples to do the same, constituted a valid justification for denying
180
the latter the opportunity to marry.
In addressing this contention, the state supreme court began by
noting that the issue was not whether there were differences between
same-sex and opposite-sex couples but was instead whether those differences were constitutionally relevant given the purposes of the law
181
being challenged. As the court explained, echoing the claim made
182
by Professor Westen in his article on equality discussed in Part I.B,
“the purposes of the law must be referenced in order to meaningfully
evaluate whether the law equally protects all people similarly situated
183
with respect to those purposes.”
What the court did not explain—a fact that is hardly surprising
since courts and legal commentators rarely do—is that the normative
assessment regarding a law’s purposes does not call for the application of egalitarian principles. In order to decide the equality issue, in other words,
the court had to consider moral and policy issues that went beyond
considerations of equality. This shows that the application of equality
doctrine is not any more self-contained—nor does it cabin judicial
discretion to a greater extent—than liberty review.
The Iowa Supreme Court, after looking at its precedents, concluded that there were two purposes behind the state’s legal recognition of marriage. First, the court noted that “our marriage laws are
rooted in the necessity of providing an institutional basis for defining
the fundamental relational rights and responsibilities of persons in
184
organized society.”
And second, the court explained “[t]hese
laws . . . serve to recognize the status of the parties’ committed rela185
tionship.”
180

181

182
183

184
185

Id. at 882. As in the same-sex marriage litigation in Connecticut, see supra notes 167–73
and accompanying text, and California, see supra note 168, the issue of whether same- and
different-sex couples were similarly situated arose in the Iowa appeal as a threshold issue.
Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 883.
The court explained that “[n]o two people or groups of people are the same in every way
[and that] nearly every equal protection claim could be run aground onto the shoals of a
threshold analysis if the two groups needed to be a mirror image of one another.” Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 883.
See supra notes 89–91 and accompanying text.
Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 883; see also Giovanna Shay, Similarly Situated, 18 GEO. MASON L.
REV. 581, 623 (2011) (“In a properly conducted, integrated equal protection analysis, the
front lines of litigation will move . . . from whether group or persons are ‘similarly situated’ in relation to one another to the definition of the statutory purpose, and more
fundamentally, of the social institution itself. These inquiries can raise big questions,
which may touch on deeply held beliefs.” (footnotes omitted)).
Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 883 (citation omitted).
Id.
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Notice that neither the court’s process for determining the marriage law’s purposes nor the substantive content of those purposes
were driven or determined by egalitarian considerations. Instead, the
court looked outside of equality norms—by determining the purposes of marriage—in order to begin to establish whether the constitutional mandate of equality applied in the case.
Also notice that determining the law’s purposes was precisely what
the California Supreme Court did in its same-sex marriage case when
186
it applied substantive due process doctrine. Although the objectives
behind the courts’ liberty and equality analyses were different—in the
case of the California court’s liberty review, the goal was to define the
fundamental right that might be at issue, while in that of the Iowa
court’s equality review, it was to determine whether same-sex couples
were similarly situated to different-sex ones—the nature of the analyses was not, with each focused, as an initial matter, on the purposes of
marriage.
In same-sex marriage equality cases, then, the first normative
question that is antecedent to the application of equality principles
relates to the purposes of marriage. But, as under the liberty analy187
sis, a court cannot limit itself to that antecedent question because,
once it concludes that the main purpose of marriage is to encourage
and promote committed relationships (regardless of procreative capabilities), it must then grapple with the additional normative inquiry
of whether gay people are capable of entering into those relationships. The Iowa court, in conducting its equality review, like the Cali188
fornia court in its due process analysis, answered that question in
the affirmative: “[W]e find that the plaintiffs are similarly situated
compared to heterosexual persons. Plaintiffs are in committed and
loving relationships, many raising families, just like heterosexual
189
couples.”
It may be argued that the assessment that lesbians and gay men
are as capable as straight people of entering into committed and loving relationships is in fact one that is internal to equality, that is, one
that is arrived at through the application of egalitarian norms and
concerns. But this is not the case. For a judge to be able to conclude
that gay people are like straight people for purposes of marriage, she
must first determine what gay people are like. That assessment requires her to consider the role that sexual orientation, and specifical186
187
188
189

See supra notes 157–62 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 163–65 and accompanying text.
See id.
Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 883.
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ly attraction to others of the same sex, plays in the capability of individuals to enter into committed and loving relationships. She must
first determine, in effect, that sexual orientation is irrelevant given
what she has already established are the principal purposes of marriage. It is only then that the judge will find the constitutional prin190
ciple of equality applicable to the dispute.
191
All of this suggests, as noted earlier, that the crucial question in
same-sex marriage cases is not so much what equality demands, but is
instead whether equality applies. It is only after a judge determines
(1) that the purpose of marriage is to encourage committed intimate
relationships (regardless of procreative considerations) and (2) that
gay people are capable of entering into and remaining in those relationships, that she will conclude that equality considerations are relevant to the dispute.
It can also be argued that equality concerns play a role in what I
am here describing as antecedent normative questions because of a
presumption, reasonably applied in same-sex marriage cases, that
most individuals are similar in fundamental matters, such as in how
they construct and depend on relationships of intimacy. I concede
that this kind of presumption likely plays a role in answering the antecedent question of whether gay people are capable of forming
192
committed and loving relationships. I also believe (although I can190

191
192



I have argued elsewhere that, in deciding which types of relationships to recognize, the
government cannot be expected to remain neutral as to their moral worth. See Carlos A.
Ball, Against Neutrality in the Legal Recognition of Intimate Relationships, 9 GEO. J. GENDER &
L. 321 (2008). A slightly different version of the same essay can be found in MORAL
ARGUMENT, SEXUAL MINORITIES, AND THE PUBLIC GOOD: ADVANCING THE DEBATE 75
(Gordon Babst et al. eds., 2009).
See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
Westen argued in his Harvard Law Review article that equality presumptions are meaningless because “[t]he idea of equality . . . expresses no preference for ‘like’ treatment as opposed to ‘unlike’ treatment. In requiring that likes be treated alike, it necessarily also requires that unlike be treated unalike.” Westen, supra note 1, at 572 (footnote omitted).
He added that “[b]ecause the principle that ‘likes should be treated alike’ does not itself
entail the idea that people are alike in more morally significant respects than they are
unalike, any presumption of the latter kind must derive its substance from outside the
idea of equality.” Id. at 574.
Some commentators criticized Westen for not sufficiently appreciating the role that a
presumption of equality can play in placing the burden of proof on those who would defend unequal treatment. See Chemerinsky, supra note 94, at 587–90; Greenawalt, supra
note 99, at 1175–78. This presumption can be crucial because, as Professor Chemerinsky
put it, “[h]istory unequivocally demonstrates that what we most have to fear is government treating differently people who deserve like treatment.” Chemerinsky, supra note
94, at 588.
In his later work, Westen conceded that a presumption in favor of equal treatment
could be valuable in “help[ing] an actor decide which rule to adopt when he is norma-
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not defend the view here) that such a presumption is normatively ap193
Nonetheless, by its very nature, a presumption is not
propriate.
dispositive, which means that a judge who relies on the presumption
to help decide a same-sex marriage case must still make an equalityindependent assessment regarding the nature and attributes of samesex relationships.
It may very well be, for example, that a judge who believes that
same-sex relationships can be as normatively good as different-sex
ones—as measured, for example, by the capability of the parties to
enter and remain in committed relationships—would not feel the
same way about incestuous or polygamous relationships. There are
limits, in other words, to how far a generalized presumption that
most individuals are similar in how they construct and depend on intimate relationships can go in helping judges make assessments about
the normative value of the relationships at issue when engaging in
equality review of marriage restrictions.
It is also important to note that it is not just judges who endorse
the equality challenges to same-sex marriage bans that must make antecedent normative assessments prior to applying egalitarian considerations; those who uphold the bans must do the same. Not surprisingly, the latter have reached different normative conclusions about
the main purposes of marriage laws than the former, usually by reasoning that those laws are primarily about promoting procreation.
For example, a majority of the justices on the Washington Supreme
Court, in upholding the constitutionality of the state’s same-sex marriage ban, concluded that “marriage is traditionally linked to procreation and survival of the human race. Heterosexual couples are the
194
only couples who can produce biological offspring of the couple.”

193
194



tively uncertain about whether to treat certain people equally or unequally.” WESTEN, supra note 50, at 249. Professor Greenawalt made this point in his 1983 essay assessing Westen’s Harvard Law Review article. See Greenawalt, supra note 99, at 1175–78. Peter Sarnoff
has taken this point one step further by arguing that it is moral uncertainty as to how to
regulate that ends up bolstering claims for equal treatment. See Peter Sarnoff, Equality as
Uncertainty, 84 IOWA L. REV. 377 (1999). As Sarnoff explains,
[p]rescriptive equality responds to [a] concern over arbitrary decision-making by
minimizing the apparent risk of imposing unjust unequal treatment while increasing to a lesser extent the apparent risk of imposing unjust equal treatment. It does
so by limiting unequal treatment to situations where decisionmakers possess a
high level of confidence in the morality of their judgmental criteria.
Id. at 381 (footnotes omitted).
See BALL, THE MORALITY OF GAY RIGHTS, supra note 47, at 103–12.
Andersen v. King Cnty., 138 P.3d 963, 982–83 (Wash. 2006); see also id. at 1002 (“The binary character of marriage exists first because there are two sexes. A society mindful of
the biologically unique nature of the marital relationship and its special capacity for procreation has ample justification for safeguarding this institution to promote procreation
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For their part, a majority of the judges on the Maryland Court of Appeals, in also rejecting the challenge to the state’s same-sex marriage
ban, concluded that “[t]he[] ‘inextricable link’ between marriage
and procreation reasonably could support the definition of marriage
as between a man and a woman only, because it is that relationship
that is capable of producing biological offspring of both members
195
(advances in reproductive technologies notwithstanding).”
Given
that these judges concluded that procreation was an essential component of marriage, the difference in the reproductive capabilities of
same-sex couples and different-sex ones became relevant to their
equality analysis, at least when applying the highly deferential ration196
al basis test.
Although judges deciding the constitutionality of same-sex marriage bans have disagreed on the essential purposes or functions of
marriage, there has been little disagreement among them on the capacity and attributes of gay people as they relate to the entering into
197
and remaining in committed and loving relationships. If anything,
it seems as of late that courts upholding the marriage bans in the face

195

196

197

and a stable environment for raising children.” (Johnson, J., concurring) (footnote omitted)).
Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571, 630–31 (Md. 2007); see also Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub.
Health, 957 A.2d 407, 519 (Conn. 2008) (Zarella, J., dissenting) (“[A] couple that is incapable of engaging in the type of sexual conduct that can result in children is not similarly situated to a couple that is capable of engaging in such conduct with respect to legislation that is intended to privilege and regulate that conduct.”); Morrison v. Sadler, 821
N.E.2d 15, 31 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (“The differentiation between opposite-sex and samesex couples in Indiana marriage law is based on inherent differences reasonably and rationally distinguishing the two classes: the ability to procreate ‘naturally.’”); Hernandez v.
Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 21 (N.Y. 2006) (“[M]arriage was instituted to address the fact that
sexual contact between a man and a woman naturally can result in pregnancy and childbirth.”).
Andersen, 138 P.3d at 983 (“Under the highly deferential rational basis inquiry, encouraging procreation between opposite-sex individuals within the framework of marriage is a
legitimate government interest furthered by limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples.”).
Given the deferential nature of the rational basis test, it is not particularly surprising that
courts which apply that standard usually end up upholding the constitutionality of the
marriage bans. See, e.g., Conaway, 932 A.2d at 630–31; Hernandez; 855 N.E.2d at 21–22;
Andersen, 138 P.3d at 982–83. Not every court that has applied the rational basis test,
however, has concluded that procreation is an essential aspect of the meaning of marriage. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts struck down the state’s ban against
same-sex marriage applying the rational basis test after concluding that commitment and
affection, rather than procreation, were the constitutive elements of marriage. See Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 961 (Mass. 2003) (“[I]t is the exclusive
and permanent commitment of the marriage partners to one another, not the begetting
of children, that is the sine qua non of civil marriage.” (footnote omitted)).
For example, even though the Washington Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality
of the state’s ban on same-sex marriage, it nonetheless recognized “that same-sex couples
enter significant, committed relationships . . . .” Andersen, 138 P.3d at 985.
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of equality challenges are reaching the opposite normative judgments
on the differences between same-sex couples and different-sex ones
than might be expected given the cases’ outcomes.
I say this because of the seeming popularity among some judges of
the so-called “responsible procreation” argument. This argument
holds that while same-sex couples must engage in considerable planning to have children (either through adoption or with the assistance
of reproductive technology), most heterosexuals can reproduce without having to think much about either the process or consequences
198
of having children. As a result, straights need the stability and benefits provided by marriage more than lesbians and gay men, and
therefore, it is argued, it is rational for the State to make marriage
199
available only to the former.
Judges who accept this argument are relying on the different ways
in which gays and (most) straights become parents to reach normative conclusions about the degree of stability and commitment that
accompanies the personal and familial relationships of lesbians and
gay men. Far from concluding that those with a same-sex sexual
orientation are incapable of forming committed and loving relationships built partly around the raising of children, these courts reason
that gay people are, in effect, too capable (at least when compared to
some heterosexuals). In the end, courts who accept the “reasonable
procreation” argument rely on this normative judgment to hold that
same-sex couples and (at least some) different-sex couples are not
similarly situated when it comes to mutual commitment and the rais-

198

199

Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 7 (“The Legislature could . . . find that [male-female] relationships are all too often casual or temporary . . . [and that] same-sex couples . . . can become parents by adoption, or by artificial insemination or other technological marvels,
but they do not become parents as a result of accident or impulse.”); see also Morrison, 821
N.E.2d at 26 (“Members of a same-sex couple who wish to have a child . . . have already
demonstrated their commitment to child-rearing, by virtue of the difficulty of obtaining a
child through adoption or assisted reproduction . . . . Conversely, the ‘casual’ intimate
acts of a same-sex couple will never result in a child, but those of an opposite-sex couple
can and frequently do.”).
Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 7 (“The Legislature could find that unstable relationships between people of the opposite sex present a greater danger that children will be born into
or grow up in unstable homes than is the case with same-sex couples, and thus that promoting stability in opposite-sex relationships will help children more.”); see also Morrison,
821 N.E.2d at 25 (“One of the State’s key interests in supporting opposite-sex marriage is
[to] . . . encourage[] opposite-sex couples who, by definition, are the only type of couples
that can reproduce on their own by engaging in sex with little or no contemplation of the
consequences that might result, i.e. a child, to procreate responsibly.”). For a critique of
the responsible procreation argument as a basis for upholding same-sex marriage bans,
see Edward Stein, The “Accidental Procreation” Argument for Withholding Legal Recognition of
Same-Sex Relationships, 84 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 403 (2009).
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ing of children, and that therefore their differential treatment under
the marriage laws is justified.
Putting aside the merits of these differing arguments and positions, it should be clear by now that regardless of how a court rules
on the validity of an equality-based challenge to a same-sex marriage
ban, normative assessments that are independent of egalitarian concerns must be incorporated into the analysis. Neither the discretion
that is part of making those assessments, nor the scope of the normative inquiry, is significantly different from what is required of judges
in assessing the validity of liberty-based challenges to gay marriage
bans.
2. Romer v. Evans
The types of normative assessments that judges make in deciding
gay rights equality cases, as we have seen in several same-sex marriage
200
rulings, can be quite explicit. But, as the Supreme Court’s decision
201
in Romer v. Evans suggests, the assessments can also be implicit. The
Court in Romer struck down a voter-approved amendment to the Colorado Constitution that would have prohibited state and local governments from adopting measures protecting lesbians, gay men, and
202
bisexuals from discrimination.
The fact that the amendment
broadly deprived the government of the authority to regulate in
203
many areas of law, when combined with the fact that it only tar204
geted gay people for differential treatment, led the Court to conclude that it was motivated by animus toward them and was therefore
205
unconstitutional.
Unlike the same-sex marriage cases decided on equality grounds
discussed in the previous section, the Court’s Romer opinion does not
contain explicit normative assessments about the capabilities and
attributes of gay people. Nonetheless, it is reasonable to conclude
that those assessments played an implicit role in the Court’s understanding of the controversy before it.
200
201
202
203

204

205

See supra notes 167–99 and accompanying text.
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
Id. at 624.
Id. (“Amendment 2, in explicit terms, . . . prohibits all legislative, executive or judicial
action at any level of state or local government designed to protect the named class [i.e.,
lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals].”).
Id. at 632 (“[T]he amendment has the peculiar property of imposing a broad and undifferentiated disability on a single named group, an exceptional and . . . invalid form of legislation.”).
Id. at 634 (“[L]aws of the kind now before us raise the inevitable inference that the disadvantage imposed is born of animosity toward the class of persons affected.”).
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The following hypothetical helps explain why this is the case:
Suppose that a municipality enacts an ordinance that prohibits employment discrimination against kleptomaniacs. This local legislative
action leads to a backlash among state wide voters who, disapproving
of kleptomaniacs, quickly endorse a constitutional amendment depriving state and local governments of the authority to provide discrimination protection to kleptomaniacs. Would the Supreme Court
hold that such an amendment violates the Equal Protection Clause?
The answer is likely no. As Professor Pamela Karlan has noted,
“[a]ll sorts of laws reflect the majority’s disapproval of (‘animus to206
ward’) an unpopular group, and yet are constitutional.” An example of such a statute is the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”),
which specifically excludes kleptomaniacs (and a select group of others including gamblers, pyromaniacs, transvestites and even gay
people) from discrimination protection in employment, public ac207
commodations, and the provision of government services.
As Karlan explains, “[t]he decision to exclude [these individuals] from the
protections others enjoy surely reflects the majority’s dislike of these
politically unpopular groups. And yet, it is hard to imagine the Supreme Court declaring the ADA unconstitutional for under208
breadth.”
If disapproval of the group in question is by itself not enough to
explain the result in Romer, then we need to look elsewhere for an
explanation of its holding. One possibility might be that, as Professor
Karlan posits, the Court’s equality analysis in Romer was influenced by
liberty considerations. That is, it might be that a majority of the
Court’s members was troubled by the Colorado antigay amendment
because of its impact on the ability of gay people to make intimacy209
related choices.
The problem with this explanation is that it is in210
consistent with Bowers v. Hardwick, a case that was not mentioned in,
211
much less explicitly overruled by, Romer.

206
207
208
209

210



Karlan, The Stereoscopic Fourteenth Amendment, supra note 34, at 484.
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12211(b)(2)(2010).
Karlan, The Stereoscopic Fourteenth Amendment, supra note 34, at 485.
As Professor Karlan explains,
[A] liberty-based perspective may explain why a law aimed at stripping protection
from gays, lesbians, and bisexuals does not constitute a legitimate government
purpose, even if a law depriving, say, thieves, does. Understanding the nature of
the liberty interest in intimate association may explain why discriminating among
individuals on the basis of the choices they make is impermissible.
Id. at 485.
478 U.S. 186 (1986). Karlan, writing before the Supreme Court overruled Hardwick in
Lawrence, acknowledged that her interpretation of Romer “confronts head-on the contin-
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It seems to me that a more plausible explanation for the outcome
in Romer is that by the time the Court decided the case, a majority of
its members had reached normative conclusions about the sexuality
of gay people—and of how its expression should not impose on them
certain legal disabilities—that were quite different from the norma212
tive assessments reached by the Hardwick Court. This does not necessarily mean, as Professor Karlan suggests, that a majority of the
Court in 1996 relied on liberty considerations to determine the
213
equality rights of gay people. But it does likely mean that a majority
of the Court’s members was by then prepared to view the engaging in
same-sex sexual conduct as normatively irrelevant, at least for purposes of whether lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals should have the
opportunity to seek antidiscrimination protection under the law.
In contrast, the Court would probably not find the conduct engaged in by kleptomaniacs to be normatively irrelevant in the same
way, thus likely leading it to conclude that depriving them of antidiscrimination protection would pass constitutional muster (perhaps in
a way that is analogous to depriving felons of the opportunity to

211

212
213

ued vitality of Hardwick.” Karlan, The Stereoscopic Fourteenth Amendment, supra note 34, at
485.
Professor Karlan believes that liberty and equality analyses inform and reinforce each
other. Karlan, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality, supra note 34, at 63 (“[J]ust as
equality can “backstop” liberty, so too liberty can serve to backstop equality. That is, liberty arguments can explain why two classes of individuals cannot be treated unequally.”);
Karlan, The Stereoscopic Fourteenth Amendment, supra note 34, at 474 (“[T]he ideas of equality and liberty expressed in the equal protection and due process clauses each emerge
from and reinforce the other.”). Tribe makes a similar point when he reasons that “due
process and equal protection, far from having separate missions and entailing different
inquiries, are profoundly interlocked in a legal double helix.” See Tribe, supra note 34, at
1898. As does Kenji Yoshino when he notes that “[t]oo much emphasis has been placed
on the formal distinction between the equality claims made under the equal protection
guarantees and the liberty claims made under the due process or other guarantees. In
practice, the Court does not abide by this distinction.” Yoshino, supra note 34, at 749.
The Supreme Court in Lawrence seemed to endorse the notion that there are mutually
reinforcing aspects to liberty and equality protections. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575
(“Equality of treatment and the due process right to demand respect for conduct protected by the substantive guarantee of liberty are linked in important respects, and a decision on the latter point advances both interests.”).
Although I do not address the issue here, the apparent hybrid nature of many liberty
and equality constitutional claims provides an additional reason to question the presumption that equality review is a more legitimate judicial enterprise than liberty review. This
is because if courts (actually and appropriately) rely on equality principles to interpret
the meaning of constitutionally protected liberty (and vice versa), it undermines the notion that liberty review is different from equality review in fundamental ways.
I discuss the normative assessments related to sexual orientation contained in Hardwick in
supra notes 129–37 and accompanying text.
See Karlan, The Stereoscopic Fourteenth Amendment, supra note 34, at 485–86.
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vote). The different way in which the Court would likely deal with
the hypothetical constitutional provision involving kleptomaniacs,
when compared with how it dealt with the amendment at issue in
Romer, suggests the extent to which the majority in that case brought
to bear positive normative judgments about gay people into its analysis.
Over thirty years ago, Professor Laurence Tribe wrote an article in
which he criticized constitutional theories, such as that of John Hart
214
215
Ely, which viewed the document primarily in procedural terms.
In doing so, Tribe asserted that the Constitution is saturated with
substantive norms, ones that are not only reflected in provisions like
the First Amendment (with its defense of values based on freedom of
216
speech and religion), but also in the Equal Protection Clause.
Tribe noted that, in order to determine whether particular groups
have been discriminated against in constitutionally improper ways,
judges must determine whether the classifications chosen by the legislature reflect prejudicial stereotypes, a determination that is substantive in nature because it requires judges to agree or disagree with “the
217
judgments that lie behind the stereotype.”
What truly matters in showing a violation of constitutional equality
218
principles, Tribe argued, is not a question of process. Nor is it the
mere existence of prejudice (since laws, for example, aimed at cur219
tailing burglary are based on prejudice against burglars).
Instead,
the key issue is one of substantive values as determined by the
220
courts. This means, as Kathleen Sullivan has put it in summarizing
214
215
216

217
218
219

220



See supra notes 110–11 and accompanying text.
Tribe, supra note 113.
As Tribe put it,
[o]ne difficulty that immediately confronts process theories is the stubbornly substantive character of so many of the Constitution’s most crucial commitments:
commitments defining the values that we as a society, acting politically, must respect. Plainly, the First Amendment’s guarantee of religious liberty and its prohibition of religious establishment are substantive in this sense.
Id. at 1065 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 1075 (emphasis omitted).
See id.
See id. Ely pointed to laws aimed at burglars, “a group toward which there is widespread
social hostility,” ELY, supra note 12, at 154, as examples of laws that should survive judicial
scrutiny. Id. at 162.
Tribe explained that
[t]he crux of any determination that a law unjustly discriminates against a
group . . . is not that the law emerges from a flawed process, or that the burden it
imposes affects an independently fundamental right, but that the law is part of a
pattern that denies those subject to it a meaningful opportunity to realize their
humanity. Necessarily, such an approach must look beyond process to identify
and proclaim fundamental substantive rights. Whatever difficulties this may entail,
it seems plain that important aspects of constitutional law, including the determi-
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Tribe’s thesis, that the application of the constitutional norm of
equality “always require[s] irreducibly substantive normative judgments, without which we cannot distinguish the equal protection
221
rights of gay people from those of burglars.”
Admittedly, the normative assessments about gay people and their
sexuality that the Romer Court likely reached are not as evident as
those that are part of the recent state supreme court rulings striking
222
down same-sex marriage bans. Nonetheless, it is reasonable to conclude that such positive normative assessments—based on “what it
223
means to be a person, and to have a sexual identity” —played an
important role in the Romer Court’s equality review given both the
outcome of the case and the likelihood that it would have ruled differently had the state constitutional amendment at issue targeted a
group whose identity or conduct, from the Court’s perspective, deserved less normative respect.
C. Liberty’s Subjectivity vs. Equality’s Dependence: A Reprise
As noted in the Introduction, one crucial reason for the perceived
reduced legitimacy of liberty review, when compared to equality review, is the belief that the former calls for a degree of judicial subjec224
tivity that the latter does not. This view holds that judges are more
likely to stray beyond their proper judicial role when they strike down
a law under substantive due process grounds than when they do so
225
under equality ones. I have here sought to challenge this perspective by showing how the normative assessments that judges make
when reviewing laws in gay rights cases under equality principles are
quite similar to those they reach when engaging in liberty review. As
we have seen, those assessments—regarding questions such as the relevancy of sexual orientation in public policy matters, the purpose of
the institution of marriage, and the capabilities of gay people to form
committed and loving relationships—have played crucial roles in the
courts’ analyses irrespective of whether the constitutional claim at is226
sue is grounded in equality or liberty principles.

221
222
223
224
225
226

nation of which groups deserve special protection, can be given significant content
in no other way.
Tribe, supra note 113, at 1077 (footnotes omitted).
Kathleen Sullivan, The Scholarship of Laurence Tribe: Law and Topology, 42 TULSA L. REV.
949, 951–52 (2007).
See supra notes 167–99 and accompanying text.
Tribe, supra note 113, at 1076.
See supra notes 19–25 and accompanying text.
See id.
See supra Parts II.A and II.B.
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Someone who is skeptical of my argument that equality review
does not cabin a judge’s discretion to a significantly greater extent
than does liberty review may argue that when a judge engages in
equality review of legislation, the substantive right at issue has already
been determined through the legislative process, limiting the judicial
function to the question of how the right can be distributed without
227
offending the Constitution.
In contrast, the fundamental rights
analysis under substantive due process calls on judges to search for
(or find) constitutional entitlements that are, by their very nature,
228
judge-created.
This means, for example, that in assessing libertybased challenges brought against same-sex marriage bans, courts
must determine whether there is a fundamental right to marry, and if
229
there is, whether it is broad enough to include same-sex couples.
In contrast, in assessing equality-based challenges to those same bans,
courts do not need to determine whether there is (or should be) a
right to marry, but must concern themselves only with how that right
is distributed.
I concede that when the two forms of judicial review are looked at
from this perspective, it appears that liberty review encourages greater judicial subjectivity because it requires judges to decide whether
there is a legal entitlement to begin with. But as I have sought to illustrate here, when one compares how judges actually go about the
process of weighing constitutional equality with how they weigh constitutional liberty, there is no longer a clear difference in the degree
of judicial subjectivity that is part of the constitutional analysis.
What I believe explains the (mis)perception that liberty review allows for significantly greater judicial normative discretion than equality review is the fact that liberty’s subjectivity is more obvious than
230
equality’s dependence.
That is, it is not as readily apparent that
judges must rely on normative assessments when deciding whether
and how to apply equality principles when compared to how they
grapple with liberty considerations. But when one digs a little deeper, as I have sought to do here, one finds that judges entertaining
equality claims routinely make normative judgments that are quite
similar to the ones they make when entertaining liberty claims.

227
228

229
230

I thank my colleague Adil Haque for raising this possible objection to my argument.
See Conkle, supra note 14, at 69 (noting that the Supreme Court, in interpreting the Liberty Clause, “has declared for itself the power to define otherwise unenumerated constitutional rights”).
The Supreme Court, of course, has already determined that there is a fundamental right
to marry. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
For a discussion of equality’s dependence, see supra Part I.B.
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It also bears noting that, although in this Article I emphasize judicial normative assessments in liberty and equality gay rights cases that
are similar in nature, there are some normative assessments that are
distinctive to equality review. For example, in deciding whether to
apply heightened scrutiny to particular classifications, courts must determine if the classifying trait “bears [any] relation to the individual’s
231
ability to participate in and contribute to society.”
It seems clear
that this type of analysis, when applied to gay rights cases, invites
judges to bring to bear their views on the impact that sexual orientation has on the character and capabilities of individuals, an assessment that is intrinsically normative. While engaging in equality review of its state’s same-sex marriage ban, for example, the
Connecticut Supreme Court concluded that the “characteristic that
defines the members of this group—attraction to persons of the same
sex—bears no logical relationship to their ability to perform in socie232
ty, either in familial relations or otherwise as productive citizens.”
Normative assessments are also part of another determination that
some courts have made in deciding whether sexual orientation classifications merit heightened scrutiny, namely, whether sexual orientation, as the Iowa Supreme Court put it, “forms a significant part of a
233
person’s identity.”
The court answered that question in the affirmative when it concluded that “[s]exual orientation influences the
formation of personal relationships between all people—
heterosexual, gay, or lesbian—to fulfill each person’s fundamental
234
needs for love and attachment.” The Connecticut Supreme Court
reasoned similarly when it noted that “[b]ecause sexual orientation is
such an essential component of personhood, even if there is some possibility that a person’s sexual preference can be altered, it would be wholly
235
unacceptable for the state to require anyone to do so.”
As these examples illustrate, judicial review of gay rights cases on
equality grounds is infused with normative assessments about the
meaning, relevance, and impact of having a same-sex sexual orientation. These assessments, unique to equality review, also undermine
the notion that equality review is more neutral or self-contained than
is liberty review.
231
232

233
234
235

Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 505 (1976).
Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 432 (Conn. 2008); see also Conaway v.
Deane, 932 A.2d 571, 609 (Md. 2007) (“Gay, lesbian, and bisexual persons likewise have
been subject to unique disabilities not truly indicative of their abilities to contribute meaningfully to society.”).
Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 893 (Iowa 2009) (citation omitted).
Id.
Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 432 (emphasis added).
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III. THE LEGITIMACY OF EQUALITY AND LIBERTY REVIEW:
INSTITUTIONAL AND REMEDIAL CONSIDERATIONS
There are other reasons—beyond the supposed greater subjectivity that is part of liberty review—that account for the greater perceived
legitimacy of equality review. In this last section of the Article, I explore two additional arguments that are frequently raised on behalf
of that greater legitimacy. The first is based on the notion of institutional legitimacy, that is, on the idea that when courts engage in
equality review, they reinforce representative democracy in ways that
236
they do not when they engage in liberty review.
The second is
based on the idea of remedial legitimacy, that is, the view that when
courts strike down legislation under due process principles, they restrict the legislature’s ability to regulate in ways that are significantly
more intrusive than when they void a law under equal protection
237
principles. As I did in Part II, I will here use gay rights constitutional litigation to question both of these generally accepted explanations
for the greater legitimacy of equality review.
A. Institutional Legitimacy
The judicial review of legislation on equality grounds gains considerable legitimacy from the widely held view that it reinforces rather
than undermines democratic rule. The Constitution does not guarantee any group (whether racial, social, ideological or otherwise) particular legislative results. But the Equal Protection Clause has been
viewed, largely as the result of John Hart Ely’s influential scholarship,
as the principal constitutional provision which helps guarantee that
elected officials will represent all of their constituents—by accounting
for the interests of everyone—when legislating. As Ely explained it,
this theory of representation, which is a central component of republican government, does not
mean that groups that constitute minorities of the population can never
be treated less favorably than the rest, but it does preclude a refusal to
represent them, the denial to minorities of what Professor [Ronald] Dworkin has called ‘equal concern and respect in the design and administration of the political institutions that govern them.’ The Fourteenth

236
237

See infra notes 238–65 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 266–96 and accompanying text. I also in this Part question the notion that
successful equality-based challenges, and the resulting incentives to broaden the impact
of legislation, always serve to protect against arbitrary and unreasonable government actions. See infra notes 297–317 and accompanying text.
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Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause is obviously our Constitution’s
238
most dramatic embodiment of this ideal.

From this perspective, the principal function of judicial review is
239
to determine when the democratic process has malfunctioned. The
crucial point for Ely was that, in contrast to the “judicial imposition of
‘fundamental values,’” “a “representation-reinforcing” understanding of the Constitution “is not inconsistent with, but on the contrary
is entirely supportive of, the American system of representational
240
democracy.” While Ely, therefore, was dismissive of substantive due
241
process doctrine, he viewed the Equal Protection Clause as the
Constitution’s key provision guaranteeing that legislatures account
242
for the interests of all when enacting laws.
But as Rebecca Brown has persuasively argued, it is not clear why
the representation-reinforcing value of judicial review should end
with equality claims. It is true that when legislation classifies individuals—by, for example, providing a benefit to (or imposing a burden
on) some that it does not provide to (or impose on) others—it is
usually clear who has gained and who has lost in the political and legislative battles leading up to enactment, and it is therefore possible to
apply the Equal Protection Clause in ways that seek to determine
whether the interests of the losers were sufficiently taken into ac243
count.
238
239

240
241
242

243



ELY, supra note 12, at 82 (footnotes omitted).
Ely explained that
[m]alfunction occurs . . . [when] (1) the ins are choking off the channels of political change to ensure that they will stay in and the outs will stay out, or (2) though
no one is actually denied a voice or a vote, representatives beholden to an effective
majority are systematically disadvantaging some minority out of simple hostility or
a prejudiced refusal to recognize commonalities of interest, and thereby denying
that minority the protection afforded other groups by a representative system.
Id. at 103 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 101–02.
Ely famously referred to substantive due process as “a contradiction in terms—sort of like
‘green pastel redness.’” Id. at 18 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 82; see also id. at 100 (noting that several of the Constitution’s provisions—“centrally
but not exclusively the Equal Protection Clause—reflect a realization that access [to the
decision making process] will not always be sufficient”). A process-based understanding
of judicial review in equality cases was endorsed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit in a case involving the constitutionality of the military’s exclusion of lesbian
and gay service members. See Watkins v. U.S. Army, 837 F.2d. 1428, 1440 (“[E]qual protection doctrine does not prevent the majority from enacting laws based on its substantive
value choices. Equal protection simply requires that the majority apply its values evenhandedly. Indeed, equal protection doctrine plays an important role in perfecting, rather than frustrating, the democratic process.”), amended by 847 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1988).
This determination, of course, is driven by the level of judicial review required by the
classification in question. “The general rule is that legislation is presumed to be valid and
will be sustained if the classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legiti-
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But, as Brown notes, laws that restrict liberty can also leave losers
in their wake because they almost always have a greater impact on
244
some than on others. This is true even if the law in question does
245
not, on its face, draw classifications among individuals.
Those
whose liberty interests are burdened by facially neutral laws can be
thought to have lost in political and legislative processes in the same
way that groups lose when they are, for example, denied a benefit
246
that is legislatively conferred on others.
Courts, therefore, should
also make themselves available to assess the validity of legislation that
impacts on liberty considerations to make sure that legislators accounted for the interests of everyone when enacting the law in ques247
tion. As Brown puts it,
if courts are to ensure that legislators have satisfied their obligation to
represent, they must be available to look at the reasons for which libertyimpairing legislation has been passed. Only by engaging in that initial
examination can a court ascertain that the interests of those bearing the
burden have not been valued negatively or at zero, a breach of the representatives’ obligation under the Constitution. Thus, there is no theoretical warrant for limiting the reach of a representation-reinforcing judi248
ciary to claims expressly invoking equality.

Sodomy laws are a good example of what Professor Brown has in
mind. Although a handful of jurisdictions, beginning in the late

244
245
246

247

248

mate state interest.” City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985)
(citations omitted). But when a legislative classification relies on race, alienage, or national origin, which are so-called suspect classifications, the Court applies strict scrutiny,
requiring that they be “suitably tailored to serve a compelling state interest.” Id. (citations
omitted). And when a classification is based on gender or illegitimacy, which are socalled quasi-suspect classifications, the Court has called for an intermediate form of scrutiny, one that requires a substantial connection to an important governmental interest.
Id. at 440–41.
See Brown, supra note 1, at 1532.
See infra notes 246–56 and accompanying text.
See Brown, supra note 1, at 1544 (“If the representative fails in the obligation to accord
this minimal concern to the interests of those bearing the burdens, then the law is
we/they legislation, despite its neutral form.”).
Brown explains that the democratic process can malfunction even when the enacted legislation fails to explicitly classify individuals:
[I]n a world of increasingly diverse personal and moral values, supporting very different notions of the good life, the communion of interests between representatives and represented can degrade even when laws nominally operate evenhandedly. For example, laws that provide that “no one may [blank]” can exploit
difference as effectively as a classification, when the blank is an activity that “we,”
the political ins, have no wish to do, but that “they,” the outs, claim a profound
need to do in pursuit of personal fulfillment. This type of prohibition suggests a
more refined way than the equality theorists anticipated to sever the communion
of interests between representative and represented that otherwise helps protect
against oppressive laws in a representative democracy.
Id. at 1498.
Id. at 1533.
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1960s, amended their sodomy statutes by making them genderspecific (that is, by decriminalizing different-sex sodomy and, for the
first time, specifically criminalizing the same-sex variety), the vast ma249
jority of sodomy statutes in American history were facially neutral.
In theory, these laws applied to everyone, yet the word “sodomy” in
the twentieth century came to be associated almost exclusively with
250
gay male sex.
As a practical matter, therefore, gay people were
burdened to a much greater extent than straight people by facially
251
neutral sodomy laws.
This greater burden was manifested in three different ways. First,
although arrests for consensual sodomy in private during the second
half of the twentieth century were rare, they were not completely unheard of, and, not surprisingly, it was gay men who sometimes found
252
themselves at the wrong end of those arrests. Second, law enforcement agencies have traditionally been quite aggressive in prosecuting
gay men for solicitation of consensual (and unremunerated) sodomy,
while ignoring heterosexuals who solicit other straight people with
253
the intent to engage in the same. And third, and most perniciously
249

250

251
252
253

BALL, supra note 75. The first state to enact a gender-specific sodomy statute was Kansas
in 1969. Id. at 208. Texas did the same four years later. Id. Eventually, “Arkansas, Kentucky, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, and Tennessee also decriminalized different-sex sodomy while, for the first time, explicitly prohibiting the same-sex variety.” Id.
Id. at 207. A dictionary published in 1996 defined sodomy as “carnal copulation between
male persons or with beasts.” THE NEW INTERNATIONAL WEBSTER’S COMPREHENSIVE
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1193 (1996); see also Tribe, supra note 34, at 1905
(“[A]lthough ‘sodomy’ is by no means a ‘gays only’ act, the term has come to carry a
strong cultural association with gay male, and to a much lesser extent lesbian, sexual activities . . . .”).
See infra notes 252–54 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186
(1986).
There is considerable evidence that law enforcement officials frequently target consensual and uncompensated male on male sexual solicitation and conduct in public places—
frequently by conducting extensive and expensive investigations—while paying little attention to the same when the sexual actors in question are of different sexes. See Christopher R. Leslie, Standing in the Way of Equality: How States Use Standing Doctrine to Insulate
Sodomy Laws from Constitutional Attack, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 29, 84 (noting that “[m]any police departments employ undercover operations designed to entrap gay men into offering
or requesting oral sex . . . . Although most sodomy laws apply equally to heterosexual and
homosexual sodomy, police departments do not expend resources in search of heterosexuals willing to give or receive oral sex (or other forms of sodomy).”); see also Martinez
v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 2005 WL 2143333 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 2, 2005), aff’d, 445 F.3d 158
(2d Cir. 2006) (ordering defendants to pay $464,000 to compensate plaintiff for police
policy of arresting men for public lewdness at a subway station without probable cause);
Baluyut v. Superior Court, 911 P.2d 1, 4 (Cal. 1996) (presenting evidence of ten solicitation arrests over a two year period which led the trial court to conclude “that the operation was focused solely on persons who had a proclivity to engage in homosexual conduct”).
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of all, the mere existence of sodomy laws contributed to the perception that all gay people—and not just those who were prosecuted un254
der those laws—were criminals and second-class citizens.
Despite the greater burden imposed on gay people by facially neutral sodomy statutes, their neutrality made equal protection chal255
lenges difficult.
As a result, the Equal Protection Clause never
256
played much of a role in challenging facially neutral sodomy laws.
254

255

256



Pamela Karlan has noted that “[t]he real problems with prohibitions on same-sex intimacy . . . come from the collateral consequences of such laws: the way in which they undergird ‘discrimination both in the public and in the private spheres’ and tell gay people
that their choices about how to live their lives are unworthy of respect.” Karlan, Loving
Lawrence, supra note 34, at 1453 (quoting Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575). Justice O’Connor
made a similar point in her Lawrence concurrence:
Texas’ sodomy law brands all homosexuals as criminals, thereby making it more
difficult for homosexuals to be treated in the same manner as everyone else. Indeed, Texas itself has previously acknowledged the collateral effects of the law, stipulating in a prior challenge to this action that the law “legally sanctions discrimination against [homosexuals] in a variety of ways unrelated to the criminal law,”
including in the areas of “employment, family issues, and housing.”
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 581–82 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (citing State v. Morales, 826
S.W.2d 201, 203 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992)); see also id. at 584 (“The State has admitted that
because of the sodomy law, being homosexual carries the presumption of being a criminal.” (citing Morales, 826 S.W.2d at 202–03)).
Successful equal protection challenges of facially neutral laws grounded in disparate
treatment, such as the one brought in Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886), are rare.
See McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 293 n.12 (1987) (noting that Yick Wo is one of those
“examples of . . . rare cases in which a statistical pattern of discriminatory impact demonstrated a constitutional violation”). As Kenji Yoshino has noted,
[i]n the vast run of cases [in the last thirty years], only facial discrimination has
drawn heightened scrutiny under the equal protection guarantees. If legislators
have the wit—which they generally do—to avoid words like “race” or the name of a
particular racial group in the text of their legislation, the courts will generally apply ordinary rational basis review. This tendency is true even if the state action has
an egregiously negative impact on a protected group.
Yoshino, supra note 34, at 764.
The majority of constitutional challenges brought against facially neutral sodomy statutes
prior to Lawrence did not include an equal protection claim. Instead, most cases were
based on due process considerations only. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186
(1986); Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48 (1975) (per curiam); Wainwright v. Stone, 414 U.S. 21
(1973) (per curiam); Balthazar v. Superior Court, 573 F.2d 698 (1st Cir. 1978); Doe v.
Commonwealth Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), aff’d, 425 U.S. 901 (1976);
Powell v. State, 510 S.E.2d 18 (Ga. 1998); Louisiana v. Smith, 766 So. 2d 501 (La. 2000).
The only exceptions appear to be two cases decided by state supreme courts in 1980. See
New York v. Onofre, 415 N.E.2d 936 (N.Y. 1980); Commonwealth v. Bonadio, 415 A.2d 47
(Pa. 1980).
Professor Laurence Tribe, who represented Michael Hardwick in his challenge to
Georgia’s sodomy law before the Supreme Court, has explained his reasoning for not
pursuing an equal protection claim in that case:
I was obviously aware of how even facially gender-neutral antisodomy laws like
Georgia’s were used principally to harass—and to justify refusals to employ, promote, or extend benefits to gay men (and to a lesser but still troublesome extent,
lesbians). I also knew that many of my gay friends and many gay rights advocates
saw Michael Hardwick’s lawsuit as an ideal opportunity to topple a major source of
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This meant that the representation-reinforcing features of that provision were generally unavailable to individuals interested in challenging the constitutionality of those laws.
If the facial neutrality of most sodomy laws provided significant
constitutional immunity to challenges under the Equal Protection
Clause, there was still the question of whether they violated the Liberty Clause. But when a gay man in Bowers v. Hardwick challenged
Georgia’s facially neutral sodomy statute under that theory, the Court
257
fell back on considerations of judicial restraint to reject it. As far as
the Hardwick Court was concerned, the decision of whether to crimi258
nalize sodomy was a legislative rather than a judicial one.
The
problem, as Professor Brown explains, is that the Court’s conclusion
in cases like Hardwick that
most liberty claims [are] best left to the “democratic process” begs the
question whether the democratic process, including the representative
obligation to give equal concern and respect to all constituents, has malfunctioned. If it has, then the Court does no favors to democracy by
looking the other way. Rather, it has an obligation to reinforce the re259
presentation that is the core of democracy.

It may be that, if Lawrence v. Texas is any indication, the Court is
beginning to take this obligation more seriously. Rather than accept
260
the state’s argument, as it had in Hardwick, that a majority of citizens are entitled to express their disapproval of same-sex sexual con-

257

258
259
260

the “straight world’s” oppression of gays, lesbians, and bisexuals. But the Supreme
Court that was sitting in 1986 seemed most unlikely to think of a man getting oral
sex from another man as no different from a man getting oral sex from a woman—even if the Georgia legislature saw fit to outlaw both acts in a single breath. If
a majority of the Justices were inclined to think of the two acts as intrinsically and
profoundly different, persuading them that a facially neutral law was being used to
treat homosexuals differently was unlikely to dent their disposition to uphold the
law.
Tribe, supra note 34, at 1951.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 195 (“There should be . . . great resistance to expand the substantive reach of th[e] [Due Process Clause], particularly if it requires redefining the category
of rights deemed to be fundamental. Otherwise, the Judiciary necessarily takes to itself
further authority to govern the country without express constitutional authority.”). Justice Scalia made a similar point in his dissent in Lawrence when he noted that Texas’s decision to criminalize same-sex sodomy was “well within the range of traditional democratic action, and its hand should not be stayed through the invention of a brand-new
‘constitutional right’ by a Court that is impatient of democratic change.” Lawrence, 539
U.S. at 603 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
See Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 194–95.
Brown, supra note 1, at 1556.
See Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 196 (noting that “the presumed belief of a majority of the electorate in Georgia that homosexual sodomy is immoral and unacceptable” constituted a
sufficient justification for the sodomy law).

Oct. 2011]

GAY RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE

63

261

duct through the criminal law, the Lawrence Court instead protected
the liberty interests of gay people from a statute that, as it acknowl262
edged, stigmatized them through its mere existence.
The fact that the Texas sodomy statute was not facially neutral
meant that the Lawrence Court had the option of striking it on Equal
Protection grounds, one that some commentators have argued the
263
Court should have pursued.
But from an institutional legitimacy
perspective, it does not make sense to suggest that the Court had a
representation-reinforcing obligation to strike down the provisions of
the four states that had gender-specific sodomy laws at the time of
Lawrence, while leaving in place the facially neutral statutes that were
264
on the books in nine other jurisdictions. Gay people living in those
nine states were as much the victims of a legislative process that failed
to sufficiently account for their interests as were gay people living in
the four states that had gender-specific sodomy laws.
Equality judicial review theorists have been effective in conditioning us to look for possible malfunctions in the democratic process as
265
reflected in how legislation classifies individuals.
But this conditioning has unfortunately occluded the important representationreinforcing potential of judicial review based on liberty principles.
The example of sodomy laws illustrates how the question of whether
261

262

263

264

265

Morality was the principal state interest relied on by Texas to justify the enactment of its
sodomy statute. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 582 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“Texas attempts to
justify its law, and the effects of the law, by arguing that the statute satisfies rational basis
review because it furthers the legitimate governmental interest of the promotion of morality.”). The Lawrence Court quoted from Justice Stevens’s dissent in Hardwick to reject
the notion that considerations of majoritarian morality were sufficient to justify a law that
criminalized consensual sexual conduct among adults. Id. at 577–78.
Id. at 575 (“When homosexual conduct is made criminal by the law of the State, that declaration in and of itself is an invitation to subject homosexual persons to discrimination
both in the public and in the private spheres.”).
See Cass R. Sunstein, What Did Lawrence Hold? Of Autonomy, Desuetude, Sexuality, and Marriage, 55 SUP. CT. REV. 27, 32 (2003) (“Rather than invalidating the Texas statute on
grounds of substantive due process, the Court should have invoked the Equal Protection
Clause to strike down, as irrational, the state’s decision to ban homosexual sodomy but
not heterosexual sodomy.”); see also Catharine A. MacKinnon, The Road Not Taken: Sex
Equality in Lawrence v. Texas, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1081 (2004) (arguing that the Lawrence
Court should have struck statute down on substantive sex equality grounds rather than
substantive due process ones).
At the time Lawrence was decided, thirteen states still criminalized consensual sodomy, “of
which 4 enforce[d] their laws only against homosexual conduct.” Lawrence, 539 U.S. at
573. The four states with gender specific sodomy statutes were Kansas, Missouri, Oklahoma, and Texas. Linda Greenhouse, Justices, 6–3, Legalize Gay Sexual Conduct in Sweeping
Reversal of Court’s ‘86 Ruling, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2003, at A1. The nine states with gender
neutral sodomy laws were Alabama, Florida, Idaho, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Utah, and Virginia. Id.
See supra notes 238–42 and accompanying text.
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courts can help achieve the goals of representational government is
not as closely correlated to the nature of the constitutional claim
(that is, whether it sounds in equality or in liberty) as some believe.
Instead, a proper understanding of the role of judicial review should
include a recognition that liberty-depriving measures, even when facially neutral, rarely impact everyone equally and that, as a result,
there is a legitimate role for courts to play, in substantive due process
cases, in making sure that legislators abide by minimum standards of
representational government when enacting laws.
B. Remedial Legitimacy
In 1949, the Supreme Court had before it the seemingly prosaic
issue of whether a New York City traffic ordinance, which prohibited
the placement of advertisement materials on a vehicle unless they
were related to the vehicle owner’s business, passed constitutional
266
muster under due process and equal protection principles.
The
Court ruled without much difficulty that the ordinance was constitu267
tional. But what the case is today mostly remembered for is a concurring opinion written by Justice Robert Jackson in which he articulated his reasons for preferring to strike down legislation under equal
268
protection principles rather than under due process ones.
When a court relies on substantive due process review to void legislation, Jackson explained, it deprives the government of the authority to legislate in a particular area, thus “leav[ing] ungoverned and
269
ungovernable conduct which many people find objectionable.” In
contrast, when a court relies on equal protection principles to strike
down a law, it does not, as a remedial matter, deprive the State of the
authority to regulate in a certain area; instead, it merely renders
270
invalid the classification that the legislature used to achieve its ends.
Rather than precluding legislation, the striking down of a law on
equality grounds may induce legislators to go back and draft new laws
271
that “have a broader impact.”
According to Justice Jackson, the impact of equality review is salutary because it requires elected representatives to test the appropriateness of their policy objectives against the views and preferences
266
267
268
269
270
271

Ry. Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949).
Id. at 109–110
Id. at 111–12 (Jackson, J., concurring).
Id. at 112.
Id. (“Invocation of the equal protection clause . . . does not disable any governmental
body from dealing with the subject at hand.”).
Id.
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of a larger (perhaps even a majority) segment of the voting public.
In a passage that has become particularly famous, he explained that
[t]he framers of the Constitution knew, and we should not forget today,
that there is no more effective practical guaranty against arbitrary and
unreasonable government than to require that the principles of law
which officials would impose upon a minority must be imposed generally.
Conversely, nothing opens the door to arbitrary action so effectively as to
allow those officials to pick and choose only a few to whom they will apply
legislation and thus to escape the political retribution that might be visited upon them if larger numbers were affected. Courts can take no better measure to assure that laws will be just than to require that laws be
272
equal in operation.

Justice Jackson, then, made two distinct points in supporting his
preference for equality review over liberty review. First, he argued
that when the latter leads to the striking down of laws, it limits legislative discretion to a significantly greater extent than the former because it makes certain areas of human conduct “ungoverned and ungovernable.” Second, and in contrast, the striking down of legislation
on equality grounds simply encourages legislators to draft laws with “a
broader impact.” (This, in turn, protects citizens against “arbitrary
and unreasonable government” because it makes legislators vulnerable to the disapproval of a larger block of voters.) In this last section
of the Article, I use gay rights issues to explain why neither of these
points is always correct.
1. Liberty Review and Limitations on Legislative Discretion
The issue of same-sex marriage may, at first blush, seem to support Justice Jackson’s first point. A successful due process challenge
to same-sex marriage bans seems more intrusive of legislative prerogatives because it appears to leave the government with little choice
273
but to make marriage available to same-sex couples.
In contrast,
when a court strikes down a same-sex marriage ban on equality
grounds, the government retains the option of ending the institution
272

273

Id. at 112–13; see also ELY, supra note 12, at 170 (“The function of the Equal Protection
Clause . . . is largely to protect against substantive outrages by requiring that those who
would harm others must at the same time harm themselves—or at least widespread elements of the constituency on which they depend for reelection . . . .”); Karst, supra note
15, at 281 (“[W]hen the legislators decide on their response [to the striking down of legislation on equal protection grounds], they must confront the fairness of the proposed
regulation in the knowledge that an effective constituency is looking over their shoulders.”).
See Tebbe & Widiss, supra note 34, at 1405–06 (“[I]f a liberty interest in civil marriage . . . were guaranteed by substantive due process, a proposal to abolish it would seem
to raise serious constitutional concerns.”).
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of marriage altogether as a way of curing the constitutional viola274
tion. This is because if everyone is denied the opportunity to mar275
ry, there can be no equal protection violation.
The apparent greater legislative flexibility that would follow an
equality-based same-sex marriage ruling, however, is of little practical
significance since it is exceedingly unlikely, at least in the near future,
that legislators would get rid of marriage altogether. This means, as a
practical (as opposed to a theoretical) matter, that there is no initial
remedial difference between striking down same-sex marriage bans
on liberty grounds as opposed to equality ones. The actual effect of
both types of rulings on the ability of the legislature to continue to
use the sex of prospective spouses as an exclusionary criterion in distributing marriage licenses would be exactly the same.
It may also be argued that when courts strike down same-sex marriage bans on equality principles, they allow for greater legislative
flexibility by making it possible for the State to abide by its constitutional obligations without having to make marriage available to samesex couples. Indeed, some state supreme courts, after concluding
that withholding the rights and benefits that accompany marriage
from same-sex couples violates equality principles under their state
constitutions, have sent the issue back to the legislature, giving it the
opportunity to cure the constitutional violation by creating comprehensive but distinct relationship-regulation mechanisms such as civil
276
unions. This type of remedial flexibility has an “obvious attraction
[because] it throws the political initiative back to officials who are
277
elected.”
274

275

276

277



See Sunstein, supra note 72, at 2084 (noting that if the right to marry falls under the “fundamental rights” branch of equal protection doctrine, “states may abolish marriage without offending the Constitution”).
See Tebbe & Widiss, supra note 34, at 1406 (“[A] state could constitutionally abolish its
civil marriage system without offending the Constitution so long as it denied access to
marriage for everyone.”).
See Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 221–22 (N.J. 2006); Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 887
(Vt. 1999). Other courts have rejected the notion that the constitutional infirmities of
same-sex marriage bans can be addressed through a separate regulatory mechanism such
as that of civil unions. See Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 412 (Conn.
2008) (“We conclude that . . . because the institution of marriage carries with it a status
and significance that the newly created classification of civil unions does not embody, the
segregation of heterosexual and homosexual couples into separate institutions constitutes
a cognizable harm.”); Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565, 570 (Mass.
2004) (“The dissimilitude between the terms ‘civil marriage’ and ‘civil union’ is not innocuous; it is a considered choice of language that reflects a demonstrable assigning of
same-sex, largely homosexual, couples to second-class status.”).
Karst, supra note 15, at 282. Karst here was referring to the general appeal of the Equal
Protection Clause as a source of constitutional review rather than to the merits of institut-
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In contrast, it may seem that the Due Process Clause allows for reduced legislative flexibility because what is at issue in liberty challenges to same-sex marriage bans is whether same-sex couples have a
fundamental right to marry. This reasoning can be questioned, however, because the fundamental right at issue in the marriage cases,
properly understood, is not the right to have one’s relationship recognized using a particular label such as that of “marriage” as opposed
to “civil union” or “domestic partnership.” It is hardly surprising, of
course, that the substantive due process cases involving the relationships of both heterosexual and same-sex couples have centered
around the institution of marriage given that, until very recently, it
was the only way through which the government provided recognition for committed and intimate relationships. But if there is an affirmative constitutional right grounded in liberty to have those relationships recognized—an issue that I have explored elsewhere and
278
cannot fully address here —it must be because the recognition itself—independent of questions of labels or of the particular package
of rights and obligations that accompany it—is an important means
through which individuals exercise their autonomy or liberty inter279
ests.
If I am correct about this, the State should be able meet its
constitutional obligations under liberty principles in this area by providing meaningful recognition of committed and intimate same-sex
relationships. The fact that that recognition might take different
forms depending on the couples’ sexual orientation undoubtedly
raises constitutional questions, but they are ones of equality and not
of liberty because they go to the issue of differential treatment.
It is also important to keep in mind that even if a court were to
hold that same-sex marriage bans are unconstitutional because they
violate substantive due process principles, it would not impact the

278
279

ing an alternative relationship-recognition mechanism for same-sex couples. The creation of such a mechanism has been criticized by many as constituting a “separate but
equal treatment” of lesbians and gay men, one that violates constitutional equality protections. See, e.g., David S. Buckel, Government Affixes a Label of Inferiority on Same-Sex Couples
When It Imposes Civil Unions & Denies Access to Marriage, 16 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 73
(2005).
See Ball, supra note 150, at 1191–1207.
See Pamela S. Karlan, Can States Abolish the Institution of Marriage?, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 697,
699 (2010) (“The Supreme Court’s substantive due process cases involving marriage . . . suggest that the freedom to marry—or at least the right of individuals to some form of
official recognition for their family relationships—may be a liberty too fundamental to eliminate.” (emphasis added)); see also Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 74 (Cal. 2009) (stating
that the fundamental right at issue in assessing the state’s same-sex marriage ban was not
the “constitutional right to marry” but was “the constitutional right to establish an officially recognized family relationship with the person of one’s choice.”).
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many other ways in which the government regulates marriage. The
State, for example, would still be able to require certain blood tests
and a minimum age for those who wish to marry. And, more importantly, the government would still be free to decide which rights and
280
obligations accompany the institution of marriage. In other words,
if the Supreme Court were to hold that the fundamental right to
marry applies to same-sex couples, it would not render marriage, in
281
Justice Jackson’s words, “ungoverned and ungovernable.”
Interestingly, it may be that rulings upholding equality challenges
to same-sex marriage bans place greater restrictions—again, as a practical matter—on the ability of the government to legislate in areas related to sexuality and relationships than liberty-based rulings. To see
why this may be the case, it is helpful to think through what the impact of Lawrence might have been on the constitutionality of gay marriage bans had the Court decided that case on equality as opposed to
liberty grounds. In his majority opinion in Lawrence striking down
Texas’s sodomy statute on due process grounds, Justice Anthony
Kennedy sought to distinguish between the constitutional authority
of the State to criminalize same-gender sexual conduct and its obligation to recognize same-gender relationships. Kennedy noted that
sodomy “statutes . . . seek to control a personal relationship that,

280

281

See Martha Nussbaum, A Right to Marry?, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 667, 686 (2010) (“It is . . . pretty
clear that the ‘right to marry’ does not obligate the state to offer any particular package
of civil benefits to people who marry.”); see also In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 426
(Cal. 2008) (noting that “the constitutional right to marry clearly does not obligate the
state to afford specific tax or other governmental benefits on the basis of a couple’s family
relationship”).
Ry. Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring).
A similar type of limited impact would have followed a Supreme Court ruling striking
down, on due process grounds, the (now repealed) “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” military personnel policy. Even if the Court had done so, the military would have still retained wide
discretion to regulate the personal conduct of its service members. See United States v.
Marcum, 60 M.J. 198, 207 (C.A.A.F. 2004) (holding that military’s prohibition against
consensual sodomy was not facially unconstitutional under Lawrence given that there are
“additional factors relevant solely in the military environment that affect the nature and
reach of the Lawrence liberty interest”).
There is also little reason to believe that a ruling striking down a same-sex marriage
ban on due process grounds would be any more likely to limit the ability of the government to prohibit incestuous or polygamous marriages than a decision based on equal
protection considerations. Indeed, it might be easier for those in incestuous or polygamous relationships to persuade courts that they have an equality-based right to the privileges and benefits afforded to others through the institution of marriage than that they enjoy a liberty-based right to have their relationships recognized by the State. This has been
true of gay plaintiffs challenging same-sex marriage bans—they have more frequently
succeeded with equality claims than with liberty ones, see supra note 167—and there is little reason to believe that it would be different for members of other groups.
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whether or not entitled to formal recognition in the law, is within the liberty
282
He
of persons to choose without being punished as criminals.”
then added that the case before the Court did “not involve whether
the government must give formal recognition to any relationships
283
that homosexual persons seek to enter.”
Despite Justice Kennedy’s efforts to distinguish between the issues
of sodomy and marriage, I have argued elsewhere that the Court’s
marriage cases, along with Lawrence v. Texas, may be understood as
imposing an affirmative, due process-based obligation on the State to
284
recognize same-sex relationships. This type of argument, however,
285
is controversial—it has been accepted by only one appellate court
286
and explicitly rejected by several others. Some commentators have
also contended that it makes no sense to think of same-sex marriage
bans as raising substantive due process issues and that, as a result,
courts should only look to equal protection considerations when as287
sessing their constitutionality. This view is based, in part, on the belief that the Due Process Clause prohibits the government from interfering with certain negative liberty rights of individuals but does not

282
283
284
285

286

287

Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003) (emphasis added).
Id. at 578.
See generally Ball, supra note 150.
In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 426 (“[I]t is apparent under the California Constitution
that the right to marry—like the right to establish a home and raise children—has independent substantive content, and cannot properly be understood as simply the right to enter into such a relationship if (but only if) the Legislature chooses to establish and retain
it.”); id. (“[T]he constitutional right to marry . . . goes beyond what is sometimes characterized as simply a ‘negative’ right insulating the couple’s relationship from overreaching
governmental intrusion or interference, and includes a ‘positive’ right to have the state
take at least some affirmative action to acknowledge and support the family unit.”).
See Standhardt v. Superior Court, 77 P.3d 451, 457 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003) (“We view [Lawrence] as acknowledging a homosexual person’s right to define his or her own existence,
and achieve the type of individual fulfillment that is a hallmark of a free society, by entering into a homosexual relationship. We do not view [Lawrence] as stating that such a right
includes the choice to enter a state-sanctioned, same-sex marriage.”); Hernandez v.
Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 10 (N.Y. 2006) (“Plaintiffs here do not, as the petitioners in Lawrence did, seek protection against state intrusion on intimate, private activity. They [instead] seek from the courts access to a state-conferred benefit that the Legislature has rationally limited to opposite-sex couples.”).
See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 72, at 2111 (“In specifying the scope of the right to marry,
the real question is the legitimacy of the lines that states draw. If that is the question, it is
appropriate to consult not the Due Process Clause, but the antidiscrimination principles
of the Equal Protection Clause . . . .”); Tebbe & Widiss, supra note 34, at 1406 (arguing
that “the right to civil marriage is primarily grounded in the Equal Protection Clause rather than the Due Process Clause”); see also id. at 1395 (“[L]iberty alone is probably the
wrong framework for thinking about the right to marry. Civil marriage, after all, is a government created and government regulated status.”).
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impose on it affirmative obligations, including any related to relation288
ship recognition.
All of this means that the Lawrence Court’s choice to strike down
Texas’s sodomy statute on due process grounds has not had much of
an impact on the constitutional validity of same-sex marriage bans.
As one commentator puts it,
one can readily observe that the litigation in support of same-sex marriage has not changed much since June of 2003 when Lawrence was
handed down. That is, such litigation has not been more or less successful, nor has it met a markedly more or less receptive audience. For all of
its sweeping language and in spite of its ecstatic reception by so many,
Lawrence has had virtually no discernable impact on the on-going wave of
289
litigation around same-sex marriage.

It is not clear, however, that the same would have been true had
the Court decided Lawrence on equal protection grounds. An equality-based ruling in Lawrence would have allowed proponents of samesex marriage to rely on it as a precedent without having to grapple
with the question, already noted, of whether substantive due process
290
provides individuals with affirmative rights. In addition, if the Lawrence Court had decided the case on equal protection grounds, it
would have had to determine the role that considerations of majoritarian morality can play, under equality principles, in establishing

288

289

290

Cass Sunstein has argued that
[s]ubstantive due process rights . . . , such as the right to freedom from governmental interference in the domain of consensual sex, . . . involve a right to freedom from government intrusion, rather than a right of access to a state-created
practice. And this very point suggests that the Court has erred insofar as it has
treated the right to marry as part of substantive due process rather than as part of
the fundamental rights branch of equal protection doctrine.
Sunstein, supra note 72, at 2096; see also Tebbe & Widiss, supra note 34, at 1378 (arguing
that “civil marriage is a government program that provides certain benefits and imposes
certain obligations. In this respect, it differs from other family-related liberties, [ones
that] exist independent of government involvement, and . . . enjoy protection against
state interference under substantive due process doctrine.”).
Justin Reinheimer, What Lawrence Should Have Said: Reconstructing an Equality Approach,
96 CALIF. L. REV. 505, 519 (2008). The one appellate court that, in striking down a samesex marriage ban, made significant references to Lawrence was the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health. The Massachusetts court noted
that the Lawrence
Court affirmed that the core concept of common human dignity protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution precludes government
intrusion into the deeply personal realms of consensual adult expressions of intimacy and one’s choice of an intimate partner. The Court also reaffirmed the central role that decisions whether to marry or have children bear in shaping one’s
identity.
Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948 (Mass. 2003).
See supra notes 284–88 and accompanying text.
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291

how the State regulates the relationships of gay people.
If the
Court had held that such considerations constituted an impermissible
basis upon which to treat gay people differently from straight people,
then it is not clear that the long history and tradition of limiting marriage to heterosexuals could serve as a justification for denying gay
people the opportunity to marry when such a choice is made available to heterosexuals. As Justice Antonin Scalia accurately noted in his
Lawrence dissent, “‘preserving the traditional institution of marriage’
is just a kinder way of describing the State’s moral disapproval of
292
same-sex couples.”
All of this suggests that had the Court decided Lawrence on equal
protection grounds, it likely would have limited the ability of the government to legislate in matters related to sexuality and relationships
to a greater extent than it actually did by deciding the case on due
293
process grounds. Indeed, although we may never know for sure, it
is reasonable to surmise that the Lawrence majority decided the case
on due process grounds in part because it understood that the government’s discretion to regulate in other sexuality-related matters—
including not only marriage, but also those involving issues such as
the now repealed “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy and whether lesbians
291

292

293

As already noted, Texas relied on considerations of morality to defend the constitutional
legitimacy of its sodomy law. See supra note 261 and accompanying text. Although the
Lawrence Court held, as a matter of due process, that the State cannot rely on morality
considerations to prohibit “a particular practice,” see Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558,
577 (2003) (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting)), it did not address the question of morality from an equal protection perspective.
See id. at 574–75 (explaining that it was deciding the case under due process, and not
equality, principles). For a discussion of the role that morality played in Lawrence, see Carlos A. Ball, The Proper Role of Morality in State Policies on Sexual Orientation and Intimate Relationships, 35 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 81, 88–93 (2011).
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 601 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia here was specifically responding to Justice O’Connor’s suggestion that while sodomy laws are unconstitutional,
same-sex marriage bans are not because “unlike the moral disapproval of same-sex relations—the asserted state interest in this case—other reasons exist to promote the institution of marriage beyond mere moral disapproval of an excluded group.” Id. at 585
(O’Connor, J., concurring). She added that one of those reasons might be the need to
“preserv[e] the traditional institution of marriage.” Id.
I want to emphasize that my argument here does not go to the question of whether the
Court was correct in deciding Lawrence on liberty as opposed to on equality grounds. I also want to make it clear that I am not suggesting that it would have been problematic if
the Court had decided Lawrence on equal protection grounds because of the extent to
which it would have restricted the government’s ability to regulate in matters related to
sexuality and relationships. Indeed, I generally support restricting the ability of the government to regulate in these matters. My point is simply that the widely accepted view
that the striking down of legislation on liberty grounds imposes greater restrictions on
the ability of the government to regulate than does the voiding of legislation under equality review is not always correct.
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and gay men should be permitted to adopt children—would be more
extensively curtailed if it relied on equal protection principles to
294
strike down Texas’s sodomy statute.
As we have seen, a perceived remedial benefit of equality review
over liberty review is that the former is thought to be more respectful
and less intrusive of the political process and of the legislature’s pre295
rogatives.
But, as I have explained here, it is not always clear that
the remedy that follows a successful due process challenge is any
more restrictive of the government’s authority to regulate than is a
296
successful equality challenge.
In fact, it may very well be that rulings upholding challenges on equality grounds are, in some instances, more restrictive of the government’s authority to determine
whether and how to regulate than ones based on substantive due
297
process considerations.
2. Equality Review and Broader Impact Legislation
298

As noted earlier, Justice Jackson’s famous concurring opinion
explaining his preference for equality review over liberty review emphasized that a successful equal protection challenge encourages legislators to go back and enact laws that have “a broader impact” in or299
der to address the constitutional violation.
This, in turn, helps
protect against “arbitrary and unreasonable government” because
legislators are less likely to impose unreasonable burdens on a larger
300
group of citizens (read: voters) than on a smaller one. This point
is one that continues to be emphasized in more contemporary times
by those who argue on behalf of the greater legitimacy of equality
judicial review over liberty review. For example, Justice Scalia, in criticizing the notion of liberty-based limitations on the State’s constitutional authority to regulate, has contended that what places “reasonable and humane” limits on the ability of the government to interfere
with the important decisions of individuals “is the Equal Protection

294

295
296
297
298
299
300

See Karlan, Loving Lawrence, supra note 34, at 1460 (“The Court may have feared that if it
struck down Texas’s statute on the ground that it violated the Equal Protection Clause to
treat gay people differently from straight people, this would require it to invalidate all
laws that treat gay and straight couples differently, the most obvious of which are laws restricting the right to marry.”).
See supra notes 265–79 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 273–81 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 282–94 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 167–69 and accompanying text.
Ry. Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring).
Id.
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Clause, which requires the democratic majority to accept for them301
selves and their loved ones what they impose on you and me.”
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor expressed a similar sentiment in her
concurrence in Lawrence v. Texas when she took issue with the Court’s
302
decision to strike down the sodomy statute on due process grounds.
A better alternative, O’Connor contended, would have been to do so
303
on equal protection principles.
This was not only because the statute explicitly targeted gay people for differential treatment on the
304
constitutionally impermissible basis of moral disapproval, but also
because the striking down of gender-specific sodomy laws like Texas’s
under the Equal Protection Clause would render facially neutral statutes vulnerable to repeal through the democratic process. As
O’Connor put it (immediately before quoting Justice Jackson’s fam305
ous passage), “I am confident . . . that so long as the Equal Protection Clause requires a sodomy law to apply equally to the private consensual conduct of homosexuals and heterosexuals alike, such a law
306
would not long stand in our democratic society.”
Yet, there is reason to be skeptical of the notion that legislation
which has a broader impact (and which therefore addresses equal
protection concerns) is enough to protect the interests of minorities,
including sexual ones. It should be noted, for example, that most
sodomy statutes in American history were of the “broad impact” variety—the vast majority of sodomy laws enacted by state legislatures over
the last two centuries made no distinctions based on the gender of
307
the sexual actors and thus, on their face, applied to everyone.
Far
from being intolerant of sodomy laws with a broad impact, however,
our democratic system let them stand for a very long time indeed.
It is true that, starting in 1961, several state legislatures repealed
their facially neutral sodomy laws, but they did so largely as part of a
wholesale adoption of the American Law Institute’s Model Penal
Code rather than as a result of any discernable political pressure from

301

302
303
304

305
306
307

Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 300 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring).
Cruzan involved the question of whether states can require terminally ill individuals to accept life-prolonging treatment. See id. at 269.
See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 579 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“I joined
Bowers, and do not join the Court in overruling it.”).
See id.
Id. at 580 (“We have consistently held . . . that some objectives, such as ‘a bare . . . desire
to harm a politically unpopular group,’ are not legitimate state interests.” (citations omitted)).
See supra note 272 and accompanying text.
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 584–85.
See BALL, supra note 75, at 207.
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sexually active heterosexuals concerned about their potential crimi308
nal liability under those laws. This lack of majoritarian pressure is
hardly surprising since, as already noted, facially neutral sodomy laws
in the middle of the twentieth century were widely understood as
aimed primarily at same-sex sexual conduct (in particular that be309
tween men). Heterosexuals rarely think of themselves as individu310
als who engage in sodomy, even if many sexually active ones seem
311
There is no
to participate in that conduct with some regularity.
reason to believe, therefore, that had the Lawrence Court struck down
the Texas sodomy statute on equal protection grounds, it would have
led political majorities in states that had facially neutral sodomy laws
312
to demand that their legislatures repeal them. Indeed, if Alabama
313
voters, for example, fifty years after Brown v. Board of Education, refused to approve a ballot measure that would have removed from the
314
state constitution a provision requiring racially segregated schools,
it is not clear that they would have ever demanded repeal of their
state’s gender-neutral sodomy law. The case of sodomy legislation,

308

309
310

311

312

313
314

See Thomas M. Keck, Beyond Backlash: Assessing the Impact of Judicial Decisions on LGBT
Rights, 43 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 151, 171 (2009) (“Twenty state legislatures . . . repealed their
sodomy laws in the 1970s and early 1980s—generally as part of a wholesale adoption of
the Model Penal Code . . . .”). The Model Penal Code, in calling for the abolition of consensual sodomy laws, did so on liberty, rather than on equality, grounds. See Model Penal
Code § 213.2 cmt. 2 (1962), reprinted in RUBENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 76, at 147 (noting
that sodomy laws “sacrifice[] personal liberty, not because the actor’s conduct results in
harm to another citizen but only because it is inconsistent with the majoritarian notion of
acceptable behavior”).
See supra note 250 and accompanying text.
See Tribe, supra note 34, at 1905 (“Many heterosexuals, even those who regularly engage
in one or another form of opposite-sex sodomy, no doubt associate ‘sodomy’ with acts
that strike them as perverse and alien.”).
A comprehensive study of Americans’ sexual practices conducted by University of Chicago researchers found that 79% of all men and 73% of all women engage in oral sex, while
26% of all men and 20% of all women engage in anal sex. EDWARD O. LAUMANN ET AL.,
THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF SEXUALITY 98–99 (1994).
As Laurence Tribe has noted,
[l]ike the fabled Sword of Damocles that does its awful work not by beheading its
victim but simply by dangling above its victim’s neck, even a sex-neutral ban on
sodomy, especially one blessed by the Court, demeans intimate homosexual relationships at the same time that its virtually complete nonenforcement greatly reduces the incentive of heterosexuals, who are not demeaned by such a ban, to agitate for its repeal.
Tribe, supra note 34, at 1910 (footnote omitted).
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
“The constitutional amendment would have struck language from the Alabama constitution saying that ‘separate schools shall be provided for white and colored children, and
no child of either race shall be permitted to attend a school of the other race.’” Susan
Pace Hammill, Book Review, A Tale of Two Alabamas, 58 ALA. L. REV. 1103, 1142 (2007)
(citations omitted).
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then, suggests that the Equal Protection Clause is not necessarily (as
315
Justice Scalia has put it) our “salvation” when it comes to legislation
that overreaches by limiting the ability of individuals to make important decisions about their intimate and personal lives.
As I have sought to explain in this part of the Article, gay rights
cases raise important questions about the widely accepted idea that
successful liberty-based challenges to legislation impose greater limi316
tations on legislative discretion than do equality-based lawsuits.
They also raise questions about the notion that successful equalitybased challenges, and the resulting incentives to broaden the impact
of legislation, always serve to protect against “arbitrary and unreasonable government” actions, reducing the necessity for courts to engage
317
in meaningful liberty review.
CONCLUSION
When the New Jersey Supreme Court was asked in 2006 to rule on
the constitutionality of the state’s ban on same-sex marriage, it expressed serious reservations about the legitimacy of doing so on liberty grounds. As the court explained,
[i]n searching for the meaning of “liberty” . . . we must resist the temptation of seeing in the majesty of that word only a mirror image of our own
strongly felt opinions and beliefs. Under the guise of newly found rights,
we must be careful not to impose our personal value system on eight-andone-half million people, thus bypassing the democratic process as the
318
primary means of effecting social change in this State.

And yet, when it came to reviewing the same legislation under
equality principles, the court a few pages later expressed complete
confidence in the legitimacy of its judicial role, noting at one point
that “[u]ltimately, we have the responsibility of ensuring that every
New Jersey citizen receives the full protection of our State Constitu319
tion.”
The disparity in the court’s understanding of its own legiti-

315
316
317
318
319

Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 300 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring).
See supra notes 265–96 and accompanying text.
Ry. Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring);
see supra notes 297–315 and accompanying text.
Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 211 (N.J. 2006).
Id. at 220 (emphasis added); see also Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407,
481 (Conn. 2008) (“[W]e do not exceed our authority by mandating equal treatment for
gay persons; in fact, any other action would be an abdication of our responsibility.”).
The Lewis court proceeded to hold that same-sex couples were constitutionally entitled to the same rights and benefits afforded under state law to different-sex married
couples, but that that entitlement did not include the right to have their relationships
recognized as marital. See Lewis, 908 A.2d. at 221–22.
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macy based on the underlying constitutional claim is striking, especially considering that while the New Jersey Constitution expressly
protects the “unalienable rights” of citizens to “liberty,” it does not
320
mention a right to the equal protection of the laws.
The New Jersey court’s view that judicial review on equality
grounds is more legitimate than review on liberty principles is widely
shared in legal circles. An important reason for this legitimacy disparity is the view that there is an intrinsic subjectivity that accompanies liberty review that is absent from equality review. I have tried in
321
this Article to show why this belief is neither conceptually correct
nor reflective of what happens in practice, at least in gay rights consti322
tutional litigation. I have also used gay rights cases to question the
widely shared perception that the degree of institutional and remedial legitimacy of equality review is significantly greater than that of li323
berty review.
If I am correct that the legitimacy of judicial review grounded in
liberty principles is comparable to that of equality review, then we
should question the skepticism (and lessen the hand-wringing) that
usually accompanies it. This does not mean, of course, that there is
less of a reason to question the particular decisions that courts make
in applying substantive due process principles in particular cases. But
it does mean that if we are generally comfortable with the idea of
judges measuring state action against constitutional principles of
equality, then we should also be generally comfortable with judges
doing the same with constitutional principles of liberty.
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See N.J. CONST., art. 1. para. 1. (The state supreme court had previously concluded that
the right to equal protection is implicit in the constitution’s “unalienable rights” provision, the same one that mentions liberty specifically. Lewis, 908 A.2d at 211–12.) Given
the general skepticism of substantive due process review, it is interesting, but not particularly surprising, that the court failed to mention the stronger textual basis for liberty review over equality review under the state constitution.
See infra Part I.
See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.

